Definitions of ??d?e?a [courage] in Plato's Socratic dialogues Three definitions of ??d?e?a are expounded in Plato's Socratic dialogues, that by Protagoras in the Protagoras, reprised by Socrates in the Republic, that by Socrates in the Protagoras, reprised by Nicias in the Laches, and that by Laches in the Laches, reprised by Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle. Laches' definition of ??d?e?a The military specialty "fighting in heavy armor" (?? ?p???? µ??es?a) is represented in the Laches as an innovation for the sake of portraying Laches' temperament. Laches argues that the laughable failure of a previous military innovation, namely a sickle lashed to a spear, suffices to reject the same inventor's innovation of "fighting in heavy armor." Laches' rock steady temperament dulls him when face to face with learning new things, a personality type well described at Tht. 144b. Theodorus contrasts that temperament with those possessing greater perspicacity yet are more manic than brave. Nicias immediately recognizes the utility of Stesilaus' innovation. At La. 192a8–b2, Socrates sets down a definition of speediness that neatly accords with the facts of the matter, that in instances of speediness, many related particulars take place in a brief period of time. Socrates' definition of speediness is a self-evident verity. The definition of speediness is followed apace by Laches' definition of ??d?e?a. I argue that Laches' words also express a truth, self-evident to those who possess and have exercised ??d?e?a, that once initiated, the exercise of ??d?e?a may be essentially characteized as an enduring resistance (?a?te??a). Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle read Plato's writings. As ?a?te??a and ??d?e?a are paired only in the Laches, it seems that all had read that dialogue. In reprising Laches' characterization of ??d?e?a, those authors testify that they read the remark as a truism and recognized that Socrates' refutation of it was specious. Tasked by Socrates to define ??d?e?a, Laches opines that a kind of ?a?te??a in the soul characterizes the exercise of ??d?e?a in all matters. Socrates expands on Laches' notion that an enduring resistive ??d?e?a may be exercised in all spheres of human activity, citing hoplites fighting in close order battle and Scythian cavalry ranging across battlefields. And more generally, in enduring painful cirumstances of all sorts and even in resisting desires and the state of poverty. Laches agrees wholeheartedly that an enduring resistive ??d?e?a is to be exercised in all circumstances. Socrates goes on to invent dubious examples of ?a?te??a that are not ?a??? [fine and honorable] and therefore not compatible with ??d?e?a, thereby reducing Laches to aporia [self-doubt]. The fact of Laches' aporia does not disconfirm the veredicality of his remark. Nicias' reprise in the Laches of Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras After Laches is reduced to aporia, Nicias in turn offers a definition of ??d?e?a, not his but borrowed. In the Meno, Socrates proposes that he and Meno "look into the things in souls" (t? ?at? t?? ????? s?e??µe?a [Men. 88a8–b1]). Meno looks into the things of his own soul, the only one available for him to look into. Meno affirms that in addition to seeing s?f??s??? and justice in his soul, he sees ??d?e?a, a quick wit, a strong memory and µe?a??p??pe?a. Nicias does not possess ??d?e?a in his soul, so cannot see it, and must borrow another's definition of it. Laches implies as much at La. 196c. Plutarch speaks of Nicias' cowardice (t?? de???a?), obscured by his good luck as a general. When Socrates alludes to the common belief that fierce animals such as leopards, stags, bears, and boars possess ??d?e?a, Nicias denies the truth of that belief, attributing the seeming ??d?e?a of animals and children to unconsidered rashness. Nicias who does not possess ??d?e?a himself is apparently unable to recognize it in animals and children. One wonders whether he would recognize ??d?e?a exercised by a man. Laches and Alcibiades, who both possessed ??d?e?a, recognized Socrates' exercise of ??d?e?a in the press of headlong flight from a military defeat. To mitigate his aggressive interlocuter, Nicias grants that Laches and a general named Lamachos possess ??d?e?a, likely relying on hearsay. Nicias proposes that ??d?e?a is the ?p?st?µ? [knowledge] of dire circumstances and benign circumstances in war and in all other affairs. That formulation reprises Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras expressed there in the grammar of a rhetorical question (Prt. 360d4–5): (sc. Is not) the s?f?a [wisdom] of dire and benign circumstances ??d?e?a? In effect, Socrates in the Laches subjects his own definition in the Protagoras to critical examination. Socrates observes that dire things (t? de???) prompt fear as benign things do not. Dire events in the past do not prompt fear. Fear in the present is the expectation of suffering future dire events. Fear of what might happen disappears when it happens. Socrates notes that ?p?st?µa? are bodies of knowledge that address their subject irrespective of time. If, according to Nicias' borrowed definition, ??d?e?a is an ?p?st?µ? that addresses only future ills, it is at best a definition of one third of an ?p?st?µ?. That objection would seem as well to apply to and disconfirm Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a as a s?f?a in the Protagoras. The referents that ?p?st?µ? and s?f?a name in Plato's vocabulary seem to differ only in nuance. Socrates' definitions of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras Initially, at Prt. 350c4–5, Socrates simply equates s?f?a and ??d?e?a. A full-length exegesis of the significance of Socrates propounding that equation and revising it at Prt. 3560d4–5 is outside the compass of this paper. Briefly, Socrates' intention behind the revision is to replace Protagoras' wise saying about ??d?e?a, at Prt. 351b1-2, so as not to lose his friendship with Hippocrates. Hippocrates wishes to be made wise, and were Protagoras' wise saying not refuted, the young man would elect to associate with the sophist, thus dissolving his friendship with Socrates. Protagoras' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras The sophist rejects Socrates' equation of ??d?e?a and s?f?a at Prt. 350c4–5 and expounds his definition of ??d?e?a at Prt. 351b1-2. The steps of his reasoning are these. Protagoras notes that physical strength (?s???) permits the exercise of power (d??aµ??). Further, that absent innate physical strength, power may also issue from a honorable (?a???) expertise, or from base (a?s????) insanity or base anger of those whose expertise, or state of insanity, or transient anger permits them to exceed their physical limitations. He returns to the subject of physical strength. In light of the fact that innately strong young boys perfect that gift under the tutelage of gym masters, the sophist observes that "?s??? comes from nature and its good nurture (e?t??f?a) in bodies." Finally, Protagoras infers that the aition of ??d?e?a is analogous to that of ?s???, stating that "??d?e?a comes from nature, and from its good nurture in souls." Socrates' reprise in the Republic of Protagoras' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras At Rep. 4.429d4 et seq. Socrates locates martial ??d?e?a in a subset of citizens, fewer than the number of metal workers; those are the guardian-soldiers of the Just City. The nature and nurture of those chosen to be guardian soldiers is likened to naturally white wool that dyers pick out from variously colored wools, and by means of a complex procedure, imbue with fast colors that do not fade even when scoured by harsh detergent. The steadfastness of the guardian-solders is like the color fastness of that dyed wool. The particulars of Socrates’ characterization of ??d?e?a are these (Rep. 4.429e8–430b5): . . . and when we choose (sc. those likely to become) soldiers (st?at??ta?) . . . educated through music and gymnastics . . . persuaded that the ??µ?? [laws] are the finest things . . . their ???? d??a [correct opinion] regarding the dreadful things (t? de???) and the other things (t? ???a) is made colorfast . . . and possessing such a gift of nature and receiving its appropriate nurture, . . . this I name and set down to be ??d?e?a. The Greek of the emphasized phrase above—d?? t? t?? te f?s?? ?a? t?? t??f?? ?p?t?de?a? ?s?????a?—echoes the sophist's characterization of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras— ??d?e?a d? ?p? f?se?? ?a? e?t??f?a? t?? ????? ????eta?—in thought and vocabulary. The reprise of Protagoras' remark in the Protagoras, which Socrates had heard when he was a young man, asserts authoritative voice, warranting that Prt. 351b1–2 is a wise saying. Definitions of ??d?e?a [courage] in Plato's Socratic dialogues Three definitions of ??d?e?a are expounded in Plato's Socratic dialogues, that by Protagoras in the Protagoras, reprised by Socrates in the Republic, that by Socrates in the Protagoras, reprised by Nicias in the Laches, and that by Laches in the Laches, reprised by Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle. Laches' definition of ??d?e?a The military specialty "fighting in heavy armor" (?? ?p???? µ??es?a) is represented in the Laches as an innovation for the sake of portraying Laches' temperament. Laches argues that the laughable failure of a previous military innovation, namely a sickle lashed to a spear, suffices to reject the same inventor's innovation of "fighting in heavy armor." Laches' rock steady temperament dulls him when face to face with learning new things, a personality type well described at Tht. 144b. Theodorus contrasts that temperament with those possessing greater perspicacity yet are more manic than brave. Nicias immediately recognizes the utility of Stesilaus' innovation. At La. 192a8–b2, Socrates sets down a definition of speediness that neatly accords with the facts of the matter, that in instances of speediness, many related particulars take place in a brief period of time. Socrates' definition of speediness is a self-evident verity. The definition of speediness is followed apace by Laches' definition of ??d?e?a. I argue that Laches' words also express a truth, self-evident to those who possess and have exercised ??d?e?a, that once initiated, the exercise of ??d?e?a may be essentially characteized as an enduring resistance (?a?te??a). Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle read Plato's writings. As ?a?te??a and ??d?e?a are paired only in the Laches, it seems that all had read that dialogue. In reprising Laches' characterization of ??d?e?a, those authors testify that they read the remark as a truism and recognized that Socrates' refutation of it was specious. Tasked by Socrates to define ??d?e?a, Laches opines that a kind of ?a?te??a in the soul characterizes the exercise of ??d?e?a in all matters. Socrates expands on Laches' notion that an enduring resistive ??d?e?a may be exercised in all spheres of human activity, citing hoplites fighting in close order battle and Scythian cavalry ranging across battlefields. And more generally, in enduring painful cirumstances of all sorts and even in resisting desires and the state of poverty. Laches agrees wholeheartedly that an enduring resistive ??d?e?a is to be exercised in all circumstances. Socrates goes on to invent dubious examples of ?a?te??a that are not ?a??? [fine and honorable] and therefore not compatible with ??d?e?a, thereby reducing Laches to aporia [self-doubt]. The fact of Laches' aporia does not disconfirm the veredicality of his remark. Nicias' reprise in the Laches of Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras After Laches is reduced to aporia, Nicias in turn offers a definition of ??d?e?a, not his but borrowed. In the Meno, Socrates proposes that he and Meno "look into the things in souls" (t? ?at? t?? ????? s?e??µe?a [Men. 88a8–b1]). Meno looks into the things of his own soul, the only one available for him to look into. Meno affirms that in addition to seeing s?f??s??? and justice in his soul, he sees ??d?e?a, a quick wit, a strong memory and µe?a??p??pe?a. Nicias does not possess ??d?e?a in his soul, so cannot see it, and must borrow another's definition of it. Laches implies as much at La. 196c. Plutarch speaks of Nicias' cowardice (t?? de???a?), obscured by his good luck as a general. When Socrates alludes to the common belief that fierce animals such as leopards, stags, bears, and boars possess ??d?e?a, Nicias denies the truth of that belief, attributing the seeming ??d?e?a of animals and children to unconsidered rashness. Nicias who does not possess ??d?e?a himself is apparently unable to recognize it in animals and children. One wonders whether he would recognize ??d?e?a exercised by a man. Laches and Alcibiades, who both possessed ??d?e?a, recognized Socrates' exercise of ??d?e?a in the press of headlong flight from a military defeat. To mitigate his aggressive interlocuter, Nicias grants that Laches and a general named Lamachos possess ??d?e?a, likely relying on hearsay. Nicias proposes that ??d?e?a is the ?p?st?µ? [knowledge] of dire circumstances and benign circumstances in war and in all other affairs. That formulation reprises Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras expressed there in the grammar of a rhetorical question (Prt. 360d4–5): (sc. Is not) the s?f?a [wisdom] of dire and benign circumstances ??d?e?a? In effect, Socrates in the Laches subjects his own definition in the Protagoras to critical examination. Socrates observes that dire things (t? de???) prompt fear as benign things do not. Dire events in the past do not prompt fear. Fear in the present is the expectation of suffering future dire events. Fear of what might happen disappears when it happens. Socrates notes that ?p?st?µa? are bodies of knowledge that address their subject irrespective of time. If, according to Nicias' borrowed definition, ??d?e?a is an ?p?st?µ? that addresses only future ills, it is at best a definition of one third of an ?p?st?µ?. That objection would seem as well to apply to and disconfirm Socrates' definition of ??d?e?a as a s?f?a in the Protagoras. The referents that ?p?st?µ? and s?f?a name in Plato's vocabulary seem to differ only in nuance. Socrates' definitions of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras Initially, at Prt. 350c4–5, Socrates simply equates s?f?a and ??d?e?a. A full-length exegesis of the significance of Socrates propounding that equation and revising it at Prt. 3560d4–5 is outside the compass of this paper. Briefly, Socrates' intention behind the revision is to replace Protagoras' wise saying about ??d?e?a, at Prt. 351b1-2, so as not to lose his friendship with Hippocrates. Hippocrates wishes to be made wise, and were Protagoras' wise saying not refuted, the young man would elect to associate with the sophist, thus dissolving his friendship with Socrates. Protagoras' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras The sophist rejects Socrates' equation of ??d?e?a and s?f?a at Prt. 350c4–5 and expounds his definition of ??d?e?a at Prt. 351b1-2. The steps of his reasoning are these. Protagoras notes that physical strength (?s???) permits the exercise of power (d??aµ??). Further, that absent innate physical strength, power may also issue from a honorable (?a???) expertise, or from base (a?s????) insanity or base anger of those whose expertise, or state of insanity, or transient anger permits them to exceed their physical limitations. He returns to the subject of physical strength. In light of the fact that innately strong young boys perfect that gift under the tutelage of gym masters, the sophist observes that "?s??? comes from nature and its good nurture (e?t??f?a) in bodies." Finally, Protagoras infers that the aition of ??d?e?a is analogous to that of ?s???, stating that "??d?e?a comes from nature, and from its good nurture in souls." Socrates' reprise in the Republic of Protagoras' definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras At Rep. 4.429d4 et seq. Socrates locates martial ??d?e?a in a subset of citizens, fewer than the number of metal workers; those are the guardian-soldiers of the Just City. The nature and nurture of those chosen to be guardian soldiers is likened to naturally white wool that dyers pick out from variously colored wools, and by means of a complex procedure, imbue with fast colors that do not fade even when scoured by harsh detergent. The steadfastness of the guardian-solders is like the color fastness of that dyed wool. The particulars of Socrates’ characterization of ??d?e?a are these (Rep. 4.429e8–430b5): . . . and when we choose (sc. those likely to become) soldiers (st?at??ta?) . . . educated through music and gymnastics . . . persuaded that the ??µ?? [laws] are the finest things . . . their ???? d??a [correct opinion] regarding the dreadful things (t? de???) and the other things (t? ???a) is made colorfast . . . and possessing such a gift of nature and receiving its appropriate nurture, . . . this I name and set down to be ??d?e?a. The Greek of the emphasized phrase above—d?? t? t?? te f?s?? ?a? t?? t??f?? ?p?t?de?a? ?s?????a?—echoes the sophist's characterization of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras— ??d?e?a d? ?p? f?se?? ?a? e?t??f?a? t?? ????? ????eta?—in thought and vocabulary. The reprise of Protagoras' remark in the Protagoras, which Socrates had heard when he was a young man, asserts authoritative voice, warranting that Prt. 351b1–2 is a wise saying. Michael Eisenstadt Austin eisenstadt0@gmail.com