ANTITHESIS IN PLATO'S EUTHYDEMUS AND LYSIS 1. Antithesis in the Euthydemus Surprisingly, Socrates' envoi to Crito in the Euthydemus receives scant attention in scholarly literature. ???’ ??sa? ?a??e?? t??? ?p?t?de???ta? f???s?f?a?, e?te ???st?? e?s?? e?te p??????, a?t? t? p???µa ßasa??sa? ?a??? te ?a? e?, ??? µ?? s?? fa???ta? fa???? ??, p??t’ ??d?a ?p?t?epe, µ? µ???? t??? ?e??• ??? d? fa???ta? ???? ??µa? a?t? ??? e??a?, ?a???? d???e ?a? ?s?e?, t? ?e??µe??? d? t??t?, a?t?? te ?a? t? pa?d?a. Then dismiss those practicing philosophy, some useful, others good for nothing, but rather weigh well and truly the thing itself (sc. the science and practice of philosophy), and if it should seem to you a paltry thing, turn everyone away from it, not only your sons. But if it seems such as I consider it to be, boldly pursue and practice it, as the saying goes, you and your sons (Euth. 307b6?c4). Crito enjoys hearing philosophical discussions, as he says (Euth. 304c6), and seems to have no trouble following their arguments. But Crito choses not to participate in Socrates' philosophical inquiries with Kleinias, although Socrates, punning on his name, urges him to do so. Now, at the end of their conversation, Socrates urges Crito to dismiss both useful and good for nothing philosophers. Aside the unsurprising dismissal of the bad ????? [speeches] of bad philosophers of the previous day, without explanation Socrates expresses dissatisfaction also with the ????? of good philosophers among whom he is presumably numbered. Possibly the good philosopher Socrates is now dismissive of some of his own ????? expounded the day before. Of course, a strict division between good and bad philosophers is misleading, for human fallibility makes it impossible that one or more philosophers invariably produce useful philosophical observations. That fact is exploited in the Euthydemus. Few of Socrates' ????? have gone unexamined. A considerable literature addresses Socrates' odd equation at Euth. 279d8 of s?f?a and e?t???a. Kleinias is surprised to hear that wisdom is good happenstance (pace Gifford, e?t???a translates easily into English). The negative fact that e?t???a in Plato's other dialogues is never associated with s?f?a is not considered pertinent. At Phdr. 245b7 and Laws 7.798b1, e?t???a is a gift of the gods. At Men. 72a6, the swarm of ??eta? [excellencies] that Meno produces in place of the single ??et? he was ordered to search for is sarcastically referred to as a stroke of good luck befalling Socrates and Meno in encountering so many ??eta?. At Laws 1.692a, fits of anger and bouts of fear befall souls owing to misfortune (d?st???a). E?t???a is named as the avoidance (?p?f??a?) of d?st???a. In that good and bad happenstance in these passages are accidental externalities that befall individuals, and s?f?a is not, Socrates' equation of those two things in the Euthydemus is a philosophical observation that one may suspect is a good for nothing ?????. Aside the merit or lack of it of his e?t???a-s?f?a equation, Socrates expounds an indisputably good for nothing ????? at Euth. 292b5–6: a listing of three conditions that may be good or bad terminates with "civic peace." In fact, civic peace, unlike wealth, freedom, quick-wittedness, bravery, and s?f??s???, but like justice and reverence for the gods, is a condition that cannot turn to harm in any conceivable situation. With one exception, commentators do not attempt to explain how civic peace may turn to harm. In light of Socrates' good for nothing truth-claim about civic peace at Euth. 292b5–6 and his seemingly good for nothing e?t???a-s?f?a equation, Plato's favored rhetoric of antithesis suggests looking for one or more instances of the contrary in the mouths of the brothers. I read Dionysodorus' remark at Euth. 301a8?9 to be a useful philosophical observation. It occurs in the course of exchanges that commence at Euth. 300e3 where Socrates characterizes the brother's activities (p???µata) as serious and fine (?a??). Seizing on a word, as is his wont, Dionysodorus asks Socrates how beautiful particulars relate to the transcendent entity Beauty: "Then are those ?a?? p???µata (sc. that you mentioned) other than Beauty or the same as Beauty?" His use of the term t? ?a??? indicates that Dionysodorus has somehow become conversant with Socrates' theory of transcendental entities. Socrates replies that ?a?? p???µata are other than Beauty itself. He goes on to say that there is yet something of Beauty present in them. Seizing now on the term pa?e??a? [to be present], Dionysodorus jokes that, on the same principle, were an ox present (oxen are castrated male bovids and docile ), a stubborn Socrates would be docile. The hitherto overlooked fact that oxen are docile provides the key for deciphering the first part of Dionysodorus' joke. Further, that Socrates, being in the company of Dionysodorus, would be Dionysodorus, by virtue of the brother's wisdom rubbing off on him. Those conditions are realized right after Dionysodorus' next remark: "Then in what way in the case of a thing that is other, in company with another thing that is other, would the (sc. initial) thing that is other retain its otherness?" ([. . .] ?t???? ?t??? pa?a?e??µ???? t? ?te??? ?te??? ?? e??;). The received interpretation of those words (Gifford, Sprague, Hawtrey, Mohr, Chance, Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi ) is that Dionysodorus is continuing to address the relationship of beautiful things to Beauty. According to that reading, the missing term t? ?a??? is to be inferred. I note that Wilamowitz, Friedländer and Guthrie, in their discussions of the passage in which it occurs, pass over Dionysodorus' remark at Euth. 301a8?9 in silence. Despite some acquaintanceship with the theory of transcendental entities, Dionysodorus ' focus is on phenomena in the real world. After his joke, Dionysodorus observes that the condition "to be present" would affect the specific relational characteristic "other (sc. than something)." The initial ?te??? thing is a particular assigned the relational characteristic "other (sc. than something)." A second particular is present, also assigned the relational characteristic "other (sc. than something)." It does not matter whether the particulars are other than the same thing or not, for the focus is on the commonality of their otherness. In that both are other, they lose their otherness in one another's presence by being the same as one another. In like wise, Socrates in the Charmides addresses the operational paradoxes of a number of relational characteristics. At Chrm. 167c8?168d1, he questions whether the d???µe?? [powers] of the senses and the affects may be applied to themselves. Socrates goes on to observe that it is logically impossible for relational characteristics such as µe????, d?p??s???, p????, ßa??te??? and p?esß?te??? to act on themselves, because in exercising their powers on themselves, they would be the contrary of themselves. Thus µe???? would be ??att?? than itself, d?p??s??? ?µ?s? of itself, etc. Dionysodorus' remark about the fugitive relational characteristic "other" seems no less a useful philosophical observation than the dicta cited above expounded by Socrates in the Charmides. At this juncture, Plato realizes Dionysodorus' joke. To Dionysodorus' remark at Euth. 301a8?9 Socrates makes no answer, for no cogent objection may be laid against a useful philosophical observation. Socrates abandons a stubborn resistance against the brothers' wisdom that so angered Dionysodorus for a docile acceptance of it. Adopting the brothers' style of posing ambiguous questions, he asks Dionysodorus "Then will you be at a loss regarding this?" Socrates parses that remark by recalling that "I was already attempting to imitate the brothers' wisdom inasmuch as I was then desirous of it." Laughter and the risible are often represented in the Euthydemus and elsewhere. However, in Plato, only philosophers smile, typically upon hearing someone philosophize. At Phd. 86d6 and 102d2, Socrates smiles at Simmias philosophizing; at Parm. 130a6–7, Parmenides and Zeno smile at Socrates philosophizing; at Tim. 21c3, Critias the Elder was very pleased by praise of Solon and smiled (sc. at the thought of Solon philsophizing). Dionysodorus smiles broadly (p??? µe?d??sa? t? p??s?p? [Euth. 275e4]) as he whispers in Socrates' ear the prediction that his brother was about to overthrow an interlocuter's opinion. Just as only a genuine missionary may convey faith to another and convert her by example, only a philosopher philosophizing may turn another to philosophy. A non-philosopher cannot convert another to philosophy for lack of example. For that reason, the non-philosopher Crito complains that he is unable to turn his son Critoboulos to philosophy (Euth. 301a2–3). Socrates urges the brothers to turn Kleinias to philosophy because he reckons them to be of the tribe of philosophers. 2. Antitheses spanning the Euthydemus and the Lysis Antitheses grounded in speech, bad and good ????? expounded by good and bad philosophers in the Euthydemus have been examined above. Plato also composed antitheses grounded in fictional events spanning two dialogues, the Euthydemus and the Lysis. I note these examples. In the Euthydemus, a pair of sophists interrogate one beautiful boy.In the Lysis, Socrates interrogates a pair of beautiful boys. In the Euthydemus, Kleinias makes a beeline for Socrates to sit down with and talk to. In the Lysis, Socrates must strategize a way to gain access to Lysis. In the Euthydemus, a ?a??? [beautiful] Ktesippos is represented as insistent on keeping in sight the boy he is courting who is indifferent to his attentions. In the Lysis, Hippothales, rejected by Lysis, hides himself from the view of his ???µe??? [beloved] who cannot bear the sight of him. In the Euthydemus, Ktesippos is erotically unsatisfied. In the Lysis, Ktesippos is the ??ast?? [lover] of his beautiful young cousin Menexenus. In the Euthydemus, Ktesippos learns Euthydemean philosophy on the fly. In the Lysis, he has already taught his ???µe??? an eristic philosophy that permits Menexenus to exercise argumentive dominance over his friend Lysis. The Euthydemus commences with Socrates in stasis sitting alone in the dressing room of a gymnasium. The Lysis commences with Socrates in motion on the way outside the city wall from the Lyceum to the Academy gymnasium. In the Euthydemus, events impose themselves on Socrates. In the Lysis, Socrates is the instigator and agent of the dramatic action. At the end of the Euthydemus, Socrates anticipates enrolling in a school of two teachers. At the end of the Lysis, Socrates anticipates teaching a class of two students. Unlike antitheses grounded in ?????, antitheses grounded in dramatic events possess no intrinsic philosophical significance because they are fortuitous, accidental occurences. Socrates at one time in stasis and Socrates at another time in motion does not constitute or provoke philosophical insight, still less Ktesippos' forwardness and Hippothales' self-effacing behavior or the beeline Kleinias makes for Socrates and the social situation at Mikkos' gymnasium that requires Socrates to strategize a way to gain access to Lysis. On the other hand, noticing antitheses provides a philosophical training that would have contributed to the e?t??f?a [good nurture] of souls that characterized teaching at Plato's Academy. One may speculate that the Euthydemus and the Lysis were assigned reading and that Plato's students subsequently sat an exam requiring a listing of as many antitheses grounded in dramatic events spanning the two dialogues as they had noticed. Michael Eisenstad Austin eisenstadt0@gmail.com Works Cited Canto, Monique. 1987. L'Intrigue Philosophique : Essai sur l'"Euthydème" de Platon. Précédé d'une traduction inédite. Paris. Chance, Thomas H. 1992. Plato's "Euthydemus": Analysis of What Is and Is Not Philosophy. Berkeley. Eisenstadt, Michael. 2018. ?a??? ????? in Plato's Meno. Social Science Research Net: 1-16. Friedländer, Paul. 1958. Plato. Hans Meyerhoff (trans.). New York. Gifford, Edwin Hamilton. 1905. The "Euthydemus" of Plato. Oxford. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1962–75. A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge. Hawtrey, R. S. W. 1981. Commentary on Plato's ”Euthydemus." Philadelphia. Mohr, Richard. 1984. ”Forms in Plato's Euthydemus.” Hermes 112: 296–300. Rider, Benjamin A. 2012. "Socrates’ Philosophical Protreptic in Euthydemus 278c–282d." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94: 208–228. Sermamoglou?Soulmaidi, Georgia. 2014. Playful Philosophy and Serious Sophistry: A Reading of Plato's "Euthydemus," (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literature und Geschichte Band 115). Berlin. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1965. Plato "Euthydemus." Indianapolis. Wilamowitz, Ulrich von, 1920. Platon. Berlin.