PLATO'S MENO: CONTRETEMPS IN THE CLASSROOM* I propose that the Meno represents a classroom session. That inference may be drawn from Socrates' use of the term "practice" (µe??t?) at Men. 75a8. Meno is told that learning the distinction between the genus and species of shape (s??µa) is good practice for addressing the topic that Socrates has imposed on the conversation, namely a search for the t? ?st? [essence} of ??et? [human excellence]. What are Socrates' epistemological assumptions for undertaking such an inquiry? On the one hand, Socrates often asserts with great conviction that he knows nothing by negating the verb e?d??a? [to know] to convey his meaning. Taken literally that would imply that Socrates is ignorant of the way to the agora and does not know Greek. So Socrates obviously is thinking of notable philsophical questions: what is the essence of ??et?, how best to live one's life, etc. On the other hand, Socrates sometimes insists with great conviction that his findings about the big questions are true to the facts. For example, at Resp. 4.429e8–430b5, Socrates characterizes ??d?e?a [courage] at length ending with these words: "this I name and set down (????e ?a?? ?a? t??eµa?) to be ??d?e?a." Similarly, in the Gorgias, comparing the blessed state and happiness of the just man to that of his opposite, Socrates instists on the truth of his assertions (Grg. 507c7?8): "These things I thus set down and affirm to be true" (??? µ?? ??? ta?ta ??t? t??eµa? ?a? f?µ? ta?ta ????? e??a?•). No convincing resolution of this contradiction has been advanced. It may be questioned whether one is needed. Who is Meno? He is portrayed in the Meno as a gentle, just, brave, quick-witted, healthy, strong, beautiful, wealthy, imperious aristocrat from Thessaly, who sees µe?a??p??pe?a [aspiration to greatness] in his soul. I am not inferring these characteristics out of thin air. Most of them are revealed at Men. 88a6–b1. Socrates: "Let us look (s?e??µe?a) into the things in the soul! Do you name each one of them s?f??s??? [prudence] and d??a??s??? [justice] and ??d?e?a [courage] and e?µa??a [quick-wittedness] and µ??µ? [powerful memory] and µe?a??p??pe?a [aspiration to greatness] and so forth?" Meno: "I do." Meno has looked at the things in his own soul, the only one available for him to look into. Consider also Men. 87e6–7. Socrates: "Let us examine what is useful to us taking them up one by one: ???e?a [health] and ?s??? [physical strength] and ?????? [beauty] and p???t?? [wealth]." Meno is known to be beautiful and wealthy. Plato often refers to disease. At Chrm. 155b4–5, Charmides is said to be suffering from headache upon arising; Theaetetus succumbed to dysentery and his wounds after the battle of Corinth; Socrates reports that when he is sick, wine tastes bitter to him (Tht. 159b3–4); illness is alleged to explain Plato's absence in the Phaedo. On the other hand, no one dramatically present in a Platonic dialogue is ever represented as suffering from disease. As Meno is beautiful, wealthy, and healthy—three of the four characteristics listed—it may be inferred that he is physically strong. For evidence of Meno's other characteristics stated in this paragraph, see Appendix A, 12–14. The concatenation of the psychic dispositions listed at Men. 88a6–b1 also occurs at Resp. 6.494a4?e6 (see below Appendix A, 13) and in the Laws. At Leg. 4.709e6–8, the Athenian stranger speaking for the lawgiver says "Grant me a city with an ideal tyrannical constitution! Let the tyrant be young and have a strong memory and be an easy learner and with aspiration to greatness in his nature!" Meno's hoards of gold and silver came by inheritance and/or his family's ties to the Persian Great King; he has won honors and offices on his own. Meno is present in Athens on official business to make a démarche to the city on behalf of the Thessalian confederacy. His official business concluded, he has informed Socrates on the previous day of his imminent departure. However, Meno is free to extend his stay at his own discretion, as he says at Men. 77a1?2: "But I would stay on, Socrates, if you were to tell me (sc. more) ????? [speeches] such as these." Meno's political ambition is unsatisfied. He harbors the intention to acquire the ??et? of the best men, plenipotentiary rulers over humankind, setting straight the cities, in which they speak for and accomplish many and great things (Men. 99d4). Although Meno is unable to grasp the essence of ??et?, he recognizes the ??et? of the great men of Greek history that informed their accomplishments and aspires to that condition. Meno and the householder in the taxonomy of the ??eta? of the various human conditions in his first definition of ??et? belong to the same political caste: citizens with shared agency who participate with other burgers in managing the city's affairs. The ??et? of the citizen, which he already possesses and exercises, is an inferior doppelgänger of the ??et? that Meno means to acquire. Were Meno to come to exercise plenipotentiary rule over others, would he do so with the justice that he possesses at the present moment? Socrates' assertion that Meno lacks self-control suggests otherwise, that the Thessalian's present possession of justice would vanish in such circumstances. When he is finally manoeuvred into addressing Meno's initial query, Socrates complains that his classroom role as teacher has been abrogated (Men. 86d3?7): If I ruled, Meno, not only over myself, but over you, we would not examine whether ??et? is teachable before we investigated what it is. For you do not wish to rule over yourself in that you are free (sc. and intend to remain so). Socrates rules over himself in this way. After repeated philosophical inquiry, producing the same results, he has confirmed to his satisfaction that the true d??a? [opinions] that justify the ethical prescriptions he obeys have been converted to settled ?p?st?µa? [knowledge] by being bound and encompassed with a logic of cause (a?t?a? ????sµ??). Aside Socrates' unique self-rule and lack of political ambition, a passage in the Laws reveals Plato's opinion regarding the invariable conduct of those who acquire plenipotentiary rule (Leg. 9.875b1?c6): And, secondly, even if a man fully grasps the truth of this (sc. that the benefit of the commonwealth supercedes private interest) as a principle of art, should he afterwards get control of the State and become an irresponsible autocrat, he would never prove able to abide by this view and to continue always fostering the public interest in the State as the object of first importance, to which the private interest is but secondary; rather, his mortal nature (? ???t? f?s??) will always urge him on to grasping and self-interested action, . . . Yet if ever there should arise a man competent by nature (my emphasis) and by a birthright of divine grace (?e?a µ???a) to assume such an office, he would have no need of the laws to rule over him (??µ?? ??d?? ?? d???t? t?? ?????t?? ?a?t??). Here the possession of a competence from nature is a necessary condition for the just ruler. That necessity stands in contradiction to Socrates' assertion, supported with the dubious counterfactual at Men. 89b1?7 (discussed below) that ??et? is not from f?s??. The conversation between Socrates and Meno features a pair of affects commonly experienced by teachers in classrooms: anger at a student who resists one's teaching, and ???? [sexual desire] for a beautiful student. The former phenomenon is described at Euthy. 295d3?5: "I am reminded of Connus (sc. Socrates' cithera teacher), how he gets angry with me everytime I don't yield to him, and then he cares less about me as being stupid." Similarly Dionysodorus expresses anger at Socrates' stubborn resistance to the brothers' wisdom at Euthy. 295b6, 295c10?11, 296a8, 297b7?8 and 297d3?4. In the Meno, Socrates expresses anger when his initial definition of shape is convincingly refuted by his student by denouncing the refutation as eristic argument which it is not. Again, Socrates' response to Meno's paradox that criticizes Socrates' foundational statement at Men. 71b4?7 is to denounce it as eristic argument which it is not. Additional captious and arbitrary instances of pedagogical anger occur when Socrates calls Meno a scoundrel (pa???????) at Men. 80b8 and again at Men. 81e6. To those in-your-face insults, Meno responds with gentle puzzlement: "How is that, Socrates?" (?? µ???sta, ? S???ate?; [Men. 81b9]). At Men. 76a9, Socrates calls Meno hybristic for simply asking to hear Socrates' theory of color. At Men. 79a7, Socrates scolds Meno for ignoring the stipulation that he not define ??et? by reference to its parts saying "Then, Meno, are you playing me?" (??ta, ? ?????, pa??e?? p??? µe;). So much for teacher's anger. Socrates observes at Men. 76c1?2 that he is "overcome by the beauties" (e?µ? ?tt?? t?? ?a???) of whom Meno is one. Meno is quite aware of his beauty and its allure. His third and final definition of ??et? is a light-hearted reference to the erotic dynamic between them. Meno: “??et? seems to me to be, as the poet says, ‘delighting in beautiful things and having the power to do so’” (?a??e?? te ?a???s? ?a? d??as?a? [Men. 77b2?5]). Both interlocutors are enjoying that condition. Socrates' repressed ???? delights in Meno's beauty. Socrates’ d??aµ?? [power] to do so lies in enunciating ?a??? ????? [beautiful speeches] that delight Meno in turn. References to a speech that seems beautifully said (?a??? ???es?a?) occur eighteen times in Plato, six times in the Meno. (The approbative locution ?a??? ???e?? occurs 40 times). The nominative expression ?a??? ????? occurs at Tht. 210d10 where Socrates characterizes an argument that has proved to contradict itself as a ?a??? ????? that has fled and run away. For ease of exposition, ?a??? ????? in these pages expresses the sense of a speech that seems beautifully said. Which of Socrates' remarks may be construed as ?a??? ?????? In the course of teaching Meno the distinction between genus and species, Socrates directs him to define the genus of shape as practice for the assigned classroom task of inquiry into ??et? in and of itself. Meno demurs, for his pa?de?a [education] apparently does not enable him to compose a general definition. He imperiously orders the teacher to define shape himself. Meno is asked if he intends that Socrates delight him by so doing (????e? s?? ?a??s?µa?; [Men. 76b2]). Meno replies, "Yes, delight me!" Socrates announces his intention to delight Meno (?a????µa? ??? s?? [Men. 76c2?3]). He goes on to define shape twice and, borrowing Empedocles' theory of effluences, color, odor and sound. Meno asks to hear more ?????. The interlocutors are reciprocally delighting in Socrates' ?a??? ????? and Meno's beauty. The dramatic details referenced above are an exact analogue of Meno's third definition of the man of ??et? who delights in beautiful things and has the power to do so. The problématique of a ?a??? ????? lies in validating or disconfirming it. Socrates describes the process of validation: a ?a??? ????? must have seemed genuine in the past, seem genuine in the present, and in the future, if any of it is to be sound (Men. 89a8?10). At Grg. 509a4?5, the ?a??? ????? that Socrates has propounded to Callicles has been re-examined frequently by its author and invariably confirmed: ?? ??? ??? ???? ?a??? ???e??: ?pe? ?µ???e ? a?t?? ????? ?st?? ?e?. Socrates complies with Meno's request that he define shape. Meno refutes Socrates' first definition of shape. Socrates accepts Meno's convincing refutation, that the definition utilizes an undefined term, with bad grace. Socrates proposes a second definition of shape to which Meno makes no objection. However, seemingly unwittingly, Socrates himself later provides counterfactuals that disconfirm both of his definitions of shape. During the geometry demonstration with the slave-boy, Socrates draws figures in the dirt with a stick. In the case of those shapes, the color inside their borders is the same as outside. That dramatic fact disconfirms the first definition of shape at Men. 75b9?11, that it "accompanies color." According to the second definition, shape is the two dimension termination or edge of a solid. As Socrates has been teaching Meno the distinction between the genus shape and the different species of shape, and citing circles and rectangles as examples of the latter, the shapes in the pair of definitions would most likely be geometrical shapes. So according to Socrates' second definition of shape, a square maps onto a cube, a triangle onto a pyramid, a circle onto a sphere. That mapping is absent in the case of geometrical shapes drawn in the dirt. Earth considered as a three-dimension solid has no correspondance with two-dimension figures drawn on her. That negative fact disconfirms the second definition of shape. If those readings are sound, Plato represents Socrates delivering a pair of false ?a??? ????? unwittingly. The corrolary of doing so would be delivering false ?a??? ????? intentionally. So far, the ?a??? ????? have all been provided by Socrates, with the exception of Meno's first definition at Men. 71e1?72a5. Asked to define ??et? without reference to any of its parts such as justice, piety, or courage, Meno declaims a ?a??? ????? of his own device that he has often delivered to public applause, setting forth a taxonomy of the various human conditions whose exemplary behavior is informed by various ??eta? [excellences] of the slave, the free man, children male and female, the old, and the wife of the householder. The paradigm case of ??et? here is the householder who is competent (??a???) to manage the city’s business (t? t?? p??e?? p??tte?? [Men. 71e1]) (sc. with the other burghers in the ?????s?a [city assembly]). That man benefits his circle of friends and family, and contrives to harm unfriendly neighbors without suffering retribution, as cities do. Socrates' request later at Men. 73c7 that Meno repeat what Gorgias said about ??et? indicates that Meno's first definition of ??et? is his own. Socrates is not impressed. He dismisses the taxonomy out of hand for producing a swarm of ??eta?, not the single ??et? that Meno has been tasked to define. Ordered back to the task of defining ??et?, with some irritation Meno reproduces, not Gorgias' definition, but this conventional view of human excellence (Men. 73c8?d1): “What other than to be able to rule over human beings—in that you are seeking some one thing in regard to all (sc. of the ??eta?).” The man of ??et? in Meno’s initial definition, who is competent to participate in managing the city’s business, shares collectively with other citizens the plenipotentiary agency exercised by rulers over humankind referenced in the second definition. As stated, Meno's ambition is unsatisfied; he apparently harbors the intention to become a single ruler exercising plenipotentiary power over others. At Men. 80d5?8, Meno poses his famous paradox: And how, Socrates, will you seek an existing thing of which you know nothing? Of (sc. the set of) things of which you know nothing, what sort of thing are you proposing that you will seek? And even at best if you should chance upon it, how would you know that that thing is the thing you did not know? Meno has realized belatedly that Socrates' avowal at Men. 71b3?4, that he knows none of the characteristics of unknowns that he seeks to know, renders inquiry into them impossible. Socrates paraphrases Meno's paradox, first dismissing it out of hand by characterizing it as a bad faith eristic quibble, which it is not, using the same rhetoric as when he grudgingly accepted Meno's convincing refutation of his first definition of shape. The paraphrase of the paradox is elaborated with the amusing corrolary that per impossibile those who are all-knowing would be reduced to idleness. That amendment to Meno's thesis does not refute it. Meno asks if what he originally said, and has just heard, not refuted, but paraphrased and amended, seems to Socrates to be a genuine ?a??? ????? (?????? ?a??? s?? d??e? ???es?a? ? ????? ??t??, ? S???ate?;). His self-approbation as its author indicates that Meno hears in Socrates' paraphrase simply a more complete expression of his ?a??? ?????. Asked whether the paradox seems to be a ?a??? ?????, Socrates replies “Not to me.” Asked further to explain why, Socrates does not answer. Instead, he propounds a theory that knowledge in souls of reincarnated individuals, acquired by virtue of having learned everything in previous existences, and during their times in the afterlife, may be recollected with the help of a skilled teacher. Socrates inserts into the exposition of the theory the tenet that all of nature is interrelated (?te ??? t?? f?se?? ?p?s?? s???e???? ??s?? [Men. 81c8?d1]). That tenet if applied to it, dissolves the epistemological impasse of Men. 71b1?4, often termed the Priority of Definition theorem. In order to validate the theory of recollection, Socrates poses a problem in geometry to an uneducated slave-boy. Through Socrates' skillful questioning of him, the slave-boy seems to solve the problem on his own. Aside its putative confirmation of the theory of the recollection of “all the things,” the slave-boy’s success in solving a problem in geometry under skillful questioning reproduces a notable phenomenon: the easiness that many, apparently Plato among them, experience in the course of being taught and learning geometry in the classroom. The notion that humans possess innate geometrical intuition is defended by Kant and other philosophers, and is supported by recent findings in cognitive science. Evidence for innate geometrical intuition is provided by demonstrations of that gift inside and outside the classroom. On the other hand, there is no real world evidence that the soul contains specific knowledge of all things—aside the mental capacity that enables an infant to acquire and produce language and to possess innate geometrical intuition—and overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The objections of Meno's paradox having been disposed of by the tenet that all of nature is interrelated embedded in the recollection theory, Socrates extolls energetic inquiry and once again urges a collaborative search for the essence of ??et?. Meno demurs insisting that Socrates address the puzzle of how ??et? is acquired. Socrates complains that his role as teacher is being abrogated but grudgingly complies. From Men. 87b2 to 90a1, over three Stephanus pages, Socrates re-examines what he had presumably already inquired into many times before: the parts of ??et?, their relationships inter se, and their several a?t?a? [sources]. He explains how s?f??s???, ??d?e?a and e?µa??a [ease in learning] are liable to turn to harm without f????s?? [practical wisdom] to guide them. That demonstration omits d??a??s??? and ?s??t?? from consideration because those parts of ??et? cannot in any conceivable situation turn to harm, thus do not require f????s?? to guide them, an opinion reprised by Protagoras at Prt. 329e5–6. Socrates has apparently often investigated the parts of ??et? and formed firm opinions about them, despite avowing the contrary at Men. 71b4?7. His re-examination of the parts of ??et? is the great ?a??? ????? of the dialogue and is recognized as such by Meno himself. At Men. 89b1?7, Socrates offers this counterfactual in support of his assertion that ??et? cannot come from f?s?? [nature]: If by nature (f?se?) excellent men (?? ??a???) came to be (???????t?), we would have those who would recognize who of the young were excellent in regard to their natures. . . Thompson (1901), Bluck (1961), Canto-Sperber (1993) and Fine (2014) pass over Men. 89b1?7 in silence. Scott (2006) 158 observes that "The argument is easily challenged." The counterfactual denies the existence of such experts as Theodorus in the Theaetetus. Theodorus, a professional teacher of young men, points out Theaetetus' innate high intelligence and equitable temperament inherited from his father Euphronius—"a man such as the one you have been describing" (??d??? ???? ?a? s? t??t?? d???? [Tht. 144e6]), as Socrates says—that makes the young man a paragon of ??et? as to his nature. Socrates argues convincingly that the lack of recognized teachers of ??et? shows that it is not taught. Socrates has "proved" that ??et? is not from f?s?? with a dubious counterfactual. As ??et? must come from somewhere, Socrates surmises that the f????s??-governed ??et? of the very small number of the best statesmen would need to come from a divine gift (?e?a µ???a), bestowed intentionally on such men by a god, unlike other parts of ??et? such as bravery or a quick wit or s?f??s??? whose steady state distribution among human beings suggests that their a?t?a? are simply automatic, mindless regularities of Nature. If Meno were to acquire the f????s??-governed ??et? of the best men, and exercise plenipotentiary rule over others, he would do well to consider himself a vehicle of divine intention. Having gratified Meno by delivering a ?a??? ????? about the parts of ??et? that he denied knowing anything about at Men. 71b4, Socrates regretfully terminates the class, asserting one final time that he and Meno should be searching for the essence of ??et? before investigating in what way it is acquired. Appendix A: a biography of Meno The characteristics of Meno are the same as those Socrates ascribes to a politically ambitious young man of exceptional natural gifts at Resp. 6.494a4?e6. The latter is wealthy, of aristocrat status and, as well, comely and tall (p???s??? . . . ?e??a??? . . . e?e?d?? . . . µ??a?). Meno is beautiful, wealthy and of aristocratic status (?a??? . . . p???s??? . . . ?e??a??? [Men. 71b6?7]). Like those externally visible goods, the psychic goods of the young man in the Republic and those of Meno are identical. Like Meno, the young man in the Republic possesses a quick wit (e?µ??e?a), a strong memory (µ??µ?), bravery (??d?e?a), and aspiration to greatness (µe?a??p??pe?a). The adolescent Theaetetus is brave (??d?e???), quick-witted (e?µa???) and gentle (p????). Meno and Theaetetus share those psychic attributes. Theaetetus fought bravely at Corinth. Meno presumably fought bravely in the military adventures recounted in Xenophon’s Anabasis. Theaetetus displays quick-wittedness throughout the Theaetetus. Meno claims title to a quick wit, and occasionally displays it. In a rapid fire series of questions about geometry requiring yes or no answers, Meno effortlessly spots the fallacious proposition that round is no more round than it is rectangular (Men. 74e7). And his instant refutation of Socrates' first definition of shape, that it relies on an undefined term, is the exercise of a quick wit. His paradox that belatedly recognizes the epistemological dead-end of Socrates' foundational statement at Men. 71b4?7 displays an impressive analytic ability. On the other hand, unlike his analogues at Resp. 6.494a4?e6 and Prt. 119c1?4, who are undifferenciated unnamed stereotypes, Plato represents this young, would-be ruler over others in the round. The evidence cited above suggests that Meno is an A+ student, yet he stumbles in learning Socrates' imposed terminology. He commits a howler in drawing this inference (Men. 97c6?8): Socrates: Then right opinion (???? d??a) is just as useful as ?p?st?µ?. Meno: With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit the mark, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, sometimes not. Several indices point to Meno possessing a gentle disposition. On the one hand, he indulges in the behavior of an aristocrat and a beauty at Men. 71b9–c2 and 76b1–2, enjoying a license not available to the very ugly Theaetetus. On the other hand, his responses to Socrates’ rank insults are invariably mild: he simply asks Socrates to explain why he is saying them. He tempers his refutal of Socrates' first definition of shape by calling the definition silly (t??t? ?e e???e?), not Socrates himself for saying it. Reminiscent of Socrates' odd prediction at the end of the Theaetetus (210c2–4), that the gentle (p????) Theaetetus' future philosophical inquiries will make him less harsh (?tt?? . . . ßa???) towards his comrades and more mild (?µe??te???), Socrates urges Meno to behave more gently (p???te???) when refuting another's definition. And at the end of the dialogue (Men. 100b8–c1), Socrates bids Meno strive to make Anytus more gentle (??a p???te??? ?), a senseless injunction unless Meno himself possesses a gentle disposition. Appendix B - Socrates' intentionally false ?a??? ????? Meno's paradox pointed out that according to what Socrates says at Men. 71b4?7 inquiry is impossible: I blame myself for not knowing about ??et? at all. If I do not know the essence of a thing, how would I know what sort of thing it is? Or does it seem to you (sc. Meno) to be possible that someone not knowing at all who Meno is, for her to know whether he is beautiful or wealthy or an aristocrat or the opposite of those conditions? With the exception of Verdenius and Fine, commentators provide various ways of reading the failure to recognize Meno analogy so as to make it true to the the facts. I argue that the analogy, like the part of Socrates' foundation statement that avows ignorance of what sort of thing ??et? is, is false to the facts. The core truth claim of the analogy is that an individual who doesn't know who a person is, would not know any of his qualities. Socrates hypothesizes someone who in no way at all knows who Meno is, in which case she would not know whether Meno is beautiful, or rich, or even an aristocrat, or the reverse. The analogy refutes itself specifically in this regard: someone who does not know at all who Meno is, would in fact know that he is beautiful, wealthy, and of aristocratic status by virtue of seeing and hearing him, and inferring those attributes from what is seen and heard. There is no contemporary testimony regarding the original mode of performance of Plato's writings. As the Meno is a performed dialogue, the original audiences may have watched and listened to it being enacted by dramatis personae impersonating Socrates, Meno, the slave-boy and Anytus. Whether reading the Meno out loud, or listening to and watching its enactment, the audience is imaginatively present at the proceedings, like a modern reader immersed in the mise en scène of a good novel. Where is Socrates' hypothesized "someone who does not recognize Meno" hypothetically located? Like the dramatis personae, and the audience hearing or reading the text out loud, she might also be imaginatively present at the proceedings, beholding Meno whom she does not recognize. Or she might be imagined to be located elsewhere, off-stage and out of sight of the proceedings (White, Scott), or even disappear entirely, replaced by decontextualized conceptual problems (Verdenius, Klein, Thomas). I argue for the former, because the specific properties (beauty, wealth, aristocratic status), which Socrates selects from the many other attributes of the foreigner from Thessaly, are visible in his person, thus would be known by virtue of being seen by the hypothesized person, were she present at the proceedings. Indeed, if she is to fail to recognize Meno, she must be present, for according to Plato’s epistemology of personal recognition, one must see or hear a person in order to recognize someone one knows, or to realize that one doesn't know who she is. To see a beautiful man unknown to one is to know in a flash that he is beautiful. Also, one may infer, from seeing the many servants who attend him, that the unknown man is wealthy. As for the unknown man's aristocratic status, that may be seen in the magnificence of his carriage typical of his caste, in the way he holds his face, and by the figure he affects, in sum by his haughty projection of privileged self. At Resp. 4.425b3?4, Socrates calls the ensemble of elements that make up a particular stance "in general the deportment of the body" (?a? ???? t?? t?? s?µat?? s??µat?sµ??). A promising young man in the Republic, who, like Meno, is rich, handsome, and of aristocratic status, is rebuked by a philosopher for "imagining himself prepared to rule over Greeks and barbarians, and elevating himself in the thought of it, puffed up in magnificent stance (s??µat?sµ?? . . . ?µp?µp??µe??? [Resp. 6.494d1?2]), with a vacant mind full of senseless fancies." Those passages in the Republic permit the inference that Meno's s??µat?sµ?? is visible, as is his beauty, and his entourage of servants, and would be seen and recognized as signifying aristocratic status by someone who does not know that she is beholding the son of Alexidemus. And if she fails to grasp the significance of Meno's s??µat?sµ??, the next remark out of his mouth confirms his aristocratic status. Meno offhandedly agrees that it is impossible for someone who does not know who he is, to know that he is beautiful, and of aristocratic status. Surprised by Socrates’ avowal of ignorance regarding ??et?, he asks (Men. 71c1?2): “if we may announce back home [sc. your eccentric opinions about ??et?]?" The contemporary audience of the dialogue listening to those words would recognize Meno's aristocratic status by hearing him use the pluralis majestatis, a mode of speech that employs the first person plural to signal privileged status. The considerations above demonstrate that Socrates' analogy in support of the foundation statement is intentionally false to the facts. The denial that someone observing Meno, whose identity she does not know, would realize in seeing and hearing him that he is beautiful, wealthy and of aristocratic status, seems to be an intentionally false ?a??? ?????. In exculpation of Socrates' flagrant deception of Meno in denying that he knows what sort of thing ??et? is, and advancing an analogy false to the facts, the foundation statement identifies Socrates' apparently sincere intention to know what ??et? is in and of itself. Indeed he means to inquire into that conundrum and bids Meno collaborate with him in that assignment throughout their classroom session. Plato's theory of the Ideas––passed over in silence in the Meno––would provide the toolkit for that inquiry. Socrates is reluctant to re-examine and reconfirm what he knows about ??et?, namely its parts, their relationships inter se and their several a?t?a?, and only does so at Meno's insistence. Michael Eisenstadt Austin eisenstadt0@gmail.com Works Cited Bluck, R. S. (1961). Plato's "Meno." Cambridge. Burnet, J. (1892). Early Greek Philosophy. London. Bury, R. G. (1926). Plato "The Laws." Cambridge, MA. Canto-Sperber, M. (1993). Platon "Ménon." Paris. 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