THE STORYLINE OF PLATO'S PROTAGORAS Methodology My aim in these pages is to demonstrate that the speeches and actions in the Protagoras are the moments of a complex, coherent, fully worked out storyline. Leo Strauss' coined term "logographic necessity" posits the necessity that everything in Plato's Socratic dialogues occurs for a reason, as in well-written short stories. I explicate how the dramatic details of the Protagoras serve to drive the argument. For instance, Socrates' unpleasantnesses visited on the sophist throughout the dialogue externalize his resentment at the prospect of losing friendship with Hippocrates, two of the three reactions that Protagoras encounters when suborning the best young men from their friends and relatives, as the sophist reveals in his impromptu autobiography at 316c5–d3. Introduction In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates investigates Protagoras' moral principles. In the second half, the sophist utters a wise saying about ??d?e?a [courage], followed by Socrates unsaying the wise saying by replacing it with an alternative definition of ??d?e?a. As Hippocrates intends to abandon friends and family in order to acquire wisdom by associating with Protagoras, the wise saying must be refuted lest Socrates lose his friendship. The titled sections below name the major stages of the storyline. 1. The testing of Protagoras (309–335b) Socrates encounters an unnamed acquaintance to whom he recounts the events of the day. Hippocrates had awakened Socrates before daybreak. He informs Socrates that Protagoras arrived in Athens the previous day, which Hippocrates only learned of late at night after dinner, for he had spent the daylight hours in the country, chasing after a runaway slave. Like Meno, Hippocrates’ personal character is often deprecated. Is Hippocrates intemperate? Socrates names indulgences in food, drink, and sex as tokens of akrasia at 353c6. The portrayal of Hippocrates’ day-long excursion through the countryside to re-enslave a fugitive slave whose name is suggestive of pleasure, and his return home at nightfall to eat dinner, seems the very negation of someone enslaved by the pleasures of food, drink and sex. Hippocrates means to dissolve his relations with family and friends, of whom Socrates is one ("we, your friends" [?µ?? t?? ?ta????]), to associate with Protagoras, not out of political ambition, but so as to be made wise. The young man jokes that the sophist has wronged him "because he is the only wise man and doesn't make me one" (310d5–6). There is no mention in this passage or elsewhere of Hippocrates harboring political ambition. Despite that negative fact, it is generally assumed that he intends to pursue a political career. Socrates warns of the danger of being poisoned by what is on offer from sophists. Just as grocers sell food for the body, some of it perchance spoiled, sophists sell food for the soul. Unlike provisions from the market, which may be carried off and tested by experts in the kitchen, the latter must be consumed immediately upon purchase. Later, at Kallias' house, Socrates presents himself and Hippocrates to Protagoras. The sophist, who does not know why they have come, asks whether they prefer to confer privately or in public. Protagoras warily asks that question because it is safer for him that the intentions of prospective associates harboring political ambitions be examined in private. On the other hand, interviews of those without political ambition may take place in public. Socrates’ reply does not identify Hippocrates’ intention, namely that the young man desires to become wise. Socrates simply evokes his wealthy and distinguished background, stating that he seems to desire to become famous in his city. Socrates bids the sophist decide whether he prefers to confer privately, or openly before others. As Protagoras desires to give a public demonstration, he thanks Socrates for providentially bringing him someone without political ambitions whose prospective association may be discussed openly: "Socrates, you have correctly divined my intention (sc. to conduct a discussion for all to hear)". Protagoras’s answer indicates that he does not judge Hippocrates’ desire to become famous in his city to require a private consultation, as is the case for interviewees harboring political ambitions. The sophist goes on to describe his modus operandi. He is a foreigner who trawls the great cities, persuading the best young men to abandon their usual converse with family and friends in order to associate with him. Those alienations of affection cause resentments (f?????), unpleasantnesses (d?sµ??e?a?), and even plots (?p?ß???a?) against his person. Doing what Protagoras does puts him in existential danger from deadly enemies. Who are those violent men? Their identity is not far to seek. It seems that Homer, Hesiod, and other sophists, fearing resentment, disguised what they were up to as best they could. But it did not escape the notice of the rulers of the cities. What they noticed is not stated. I suggest that the rulers noticed that promising young men in their inner circles, closely bound to them by ties of friendship and family, but impatient to rule in their stead, were engaging in private consultations with new associates. The attendees assembled and seated, Socrates is asked to repeat what he said before, that Hippocrates desires to become well-spoken of by his fellow citizens. Instead, Socrates asks what the young man will get from associating with Protagoras. The sophist promises that he will get what he came for. Socrates presses him to say exactly what that might be. Protagoras reveals that his µ???µa [teaching] is for managing optimally one's estate "and that one might be the most powerful in the affairs of the city in doing and speaking." Later on, at 354b4–5, "rule over others" (????? ???a?) and "wealth" (p???t??) terminate a list of pleasures. The former is a lapidary phrase, capturing in two words the essence of being preeminent in the affairs of the city in speaking in favor of one's agenda and effecting it; the latter term names the telos of Protagoras teaching how best to manage one's estate. Socrates closes off the prospect of wealth and rule over others by recasting Protagoras' µ???µa into a harmless platitude, namely that the sophist's teaching is the science of politics and making men into good citizens. Socrates' paraphrase obscures what the sophist actually teaches. Earlier, Socrates spoke of the danger of purchasing food for the soul from a sophist that must be consumed immediately; here, in effect, he has carried it off uneaten to be tested. Socrates asserts that ??et? [human excellence] is not teachable. He cites counterfactual conditions the first of which is easily refuted. The Athenians follow apparently contradictory rules when meeting in the ekklesia [assembly]. On the one hand, they accept advice on technical issues only from competent professionals trained by known teachers. On the other hand, any citizen may offer advice about managing the city’s affairs, whether rich or poor, aristocrat or menial, without being asked who taught him d??a??s??? [justice] and s?f??s??? [prudence], which are required to advise competently on matters of policy. Unlike the case of professionally trained experts, citizens cannot name their teacher. As Protagoras points out in his speech, the contradiction disappears when one takes into account the fact that citizens acquire those twin aspects of ??et?, not by paying experts to teach it to them, but by emulating their elders, and through long practice, each eventually deeming himself expert in making just and prudent policy decisions. Socrates' better argument for the thesis that ??et? is not teachable relies on the fact that men of great excellence, appear from time to time, and are recognized in their accomplishments by their contemporaries to possess ??et? in full. Yet they have no known teacher of their excellence, nor are they able to transmit it to their sons. In the Great Speech, Protagoras commends the practice of having children read poetry about great and good men of old "so that the child be zealous to imitate them and to strive to become such as they were," but he does not address the deep question of how great men come to possess ??et? in full. Protagoras' opinion that man is unjust in his nature informs his account of the origin and formation of mankind, told in the form of a myth. The impending extirpation of humankind, whose lawlessness towards one another prevented concerted resistance against packs of predator animals, and rendered living together in cities impossible, was averted by Zeus' contrivance: in order that they might live together in cities, all must be coerced to be just towards one another. Protagoras describes the process by which citizens assiduously inculcate a demotic ??et? into their children. Aside the charm of the origin myth, and the logos of civilization that it entails, exactly what Protagoras teaches those who intend to rule over others is as yet unknown. It remains to be determined whether or not, according to the sophist’s teaching, the s?f??? ruler over others practices ?d???a. Socrates’ methodology for testing the sophist in that regard proceeds by indirection. Pairs of abstractions are examined: d??a??s??? and ?s??t? [piety], s?f??s??? and s?f?a [wisdom], and ?d???a [injustice] and s?f??s???. I note that the penultimate abstraction is not d??a??s???, as is universally asserted, but its negation. The word d??a??s??? or cognate forms do not appear in the third discussion, in contrast to ?d????, ?d??e?, ?d????s??, and ?d?????te?, the latter twice. Following Kahn, I read the third discussion, not as a testing of propositions, but as a testing of Protagoras the man. In a preliminary interrogatory, Socrates elicits Protagoras’ theory of ??et?, that its parts are different from one another, and have different functions, as different as the mouth's function is to that of the eyes, and are unlike pieces of gold, which differ only in largeness and smallness, and that having one part does not imply that one has another part, unlike parts of the face. Socrates states a contrary view, that "all the names (sc. of the parts of ??et?) reference the same unitary existent thing" (p??ta ???µata t?? a?t?? ???? ??t?? [321d1]). That idea is restated at 349b2–3: "there are five names (sc. d??a??s???, ?s??t??, s?f??s???, s?f?a, ??d?e?a) that inhere in the unitary practice (sc. of ??et?)" (p??te ??ta ???µata, ?p? ??? p???µat? ?st??). I read Socrates’ so-called Unity of the Virtues thesis at 321d1 and 348b2–3 to be instances of Plato's favored rhetoric of antithesis: the thesis that the ??et? that humans practice is a single thing referred to by five different names is the absolute negation of Protagoras' commonsensical opinions about humans practicing justice in the city, reverencing the gods in cult observances, displaying courage in battle, etc. Socrates' Unity of the Virtues thesis is often taken to represent a permanent core belief, a reading which is belied by what Socrates says about the parts of ??et? in other dialogues. According to Protagoras, the words d??a??s???, ?s??t??, s?f??s???, s?f?a and ??d?e?a name different human behaviors, compresent or not as may be. As he says (329e5–6), many are ??d?e???, but unjust, and (sc. many) are just, but not wise. The former pair of uncongenial dispositions reminds that the primitive men of the myth would have exercised ??d?e?a in killing or fending off a dangerous animal, singulatim, with firebrand or farm implement. But in the war against packs of predator animals, they were the weaker because, unlike the animals, they lacked justice vis-à-vis their fellows, so that they did not come to one another's defense. As for the latter pair of dispositions, Protagoras agrees with Socrates in the Meno that the law-abiding polloi are just but not wise. It is also represented in the Great Speech that the innate disposition of men to reverence the gods (?s??t??) existed in mythical time, anterior to historical time when cities were established and justice came into existence. Protagoras’ Great Speech concluded, Socrates initiates a series of discussions. The first discussion commences with Socrates and Protagoras agreeing that ?s??t?? [piety] and d??a??s??? [justice] are real life activities practiced in cities. Socrates states that ?s???, the eponymous attribute of ?s??t??, applies to d??a??s??? and vice versa. Protagoras is not entirely in agreement. He proposes that Socrates' proposition be assumed as a hypothesis: "Let us assume that that d??a??s??? is ?s??? and ?s??t?? is d??a???." Socrates forbids Protagoras the use of hypotheticals. To that diktat, Protagoras replies that everything may be hypothesized: "in one way or another, all things are the same as everything else." Accordingly, even opposites like black and white, hard and soft, have some degree of likeness. Socrates dares Protagoras to say that piety and justice have as little in common as black and white. "Not so, he replies, at all, nor yet, on the other hand, as I believe you regard them." Socrates intuits the sophist’s feelings that fuel those words, and reveals them to the audience: "Since you seem to me to be in a state of displeasure as regards our conversation (?pe?d? d?s?e??? d??e?? µ?? ??e?? p??? t??t?), let's drop it and examine something else you said." Protagoras’ d?s???e?a that Socrates' diktat and his subsequent remarks provoke is his reaction to the unpleasantnesses the sophist spoke of earlier, that he typically experiences at the hands of those who, like Socrates, resent the prospect of losing an intimate to the sophist’s circle. In the second discussion, Socrates states that it is necessarily the case that a thing have only one opposite thing. Consequently, s?f?a and s?f??s??? are identical because the same thing is their opposite, namely "thoughtlessness" (?f??s???). Protagoras agrees very reluctantly to that dubious argument. Socrates recapitulates the conclusions of the prior discussions: "Then s?f??s??? and s?f?a would be one? And before that, we saw that d??a??s??? and ?s??t?? were virtually the same." The subsequent discussion (333b7–335c7) has been interpreted as an ultimately aborted attempt by Socrates to prove that d??a??s??? is the same as s?f??s???. The text suggests otherwise. As stated, the word d??a??s??? does not occur in this passage; ?d???a and cognates occur five times. Socrates predicts that it is now the turn of Protagoras himself to submit to being tested. The sophist discountenances such an examination, alleging that it would be displeasing, but eventually agrees to answer. Socrates asks Protagoras "whether it seems to you that an unjust man might exercise s?f??s???, while committing injustice?" (??? t?? s?? d??e? ?d???? ?????p?? s?f???e??, ?t? ?d??e?;). Protagoras replies "I would be ashamed to agree, although there are many who say that." The received opinion of that exchange is that Protagoras disagrees with the proposition. But the sophist has already approvingly cited, in the Great Speech, the view that he is now ashamed to call his own: ". . . if it is known that someone is ?d????, and if he says the truth about himself before others, what was deemed to be s?f??s??? elsewhere, here is insanity: everyone agrees that all must say they are d??a??? whether they are so or not . . . ." Socrates repeats the question: "Do some men seem to you to be s?f???, while practicing ?d???a?" Protagoras: ?st?, ?f? ["Let it be so!"]. The sophist affirms the proposition hypothetically. Socrates: "And you agree that exercising prudence (s?f???e??) is the same as practicing good sense?" (e? f???e??). Protagoras: ?f?. The sophist affirms this in his own voice. Socrates: "And that e? f???e?? is (sc. the same as) e? ß???e?es?a? [planning well], while practicing ?d???a?" Protagoras: ?st?, ?f?. E?ß????a is surely what Protagoras teaches (cf. 318e5), but the reappearance of the condition "while practicing ?d???a" forces him, again, to answer hypothetically. Socrates' repetition, retraction, and reinsertion of the damning phrase drives the sophist to frame his answers alternatively in the third person hypothetical or first person indicative. That is embarassingly revelatory of Protagoras’ private opinion that ?d???a and s?f??s??? are compatible. Socrates lobs him a soft ball: ??te???, ?? d’ ???, e? e? p??tt??s?? ?d?????te? ? e? ?a???; ["Which is it?" I asked. "If those acting unjustly are faring well or if ill?"]. The syntax permits Protagoras to reply simply e? e? ["If (sc. acting unjustly), (sc. faring) well"], thereby obscuring whether he is affirming the transgressive proposition in propria voce or hypothesizing it. Protagoras' private opinion that ?d???a and s?f??s??? are compatible is now sufficiently established, so further inquiry on Socrates' part would serve no purpose. Socrates changes the subject asking "Do you affirm that good things (??a??) exist . . . and that they are useful to humankind?" Protagoras replies with an oath that good things do not exist exclusively for humankind. Socrates notes that the sophist seemed quite exasperated and antagonistic and set against answering any more questions. Socrates proceeds more cautiously than before and asks for clarification regarding the role of ??a??. The sophist delivers a speech on different kinds of ??a??. One kind of ??a?? is useful to one species of animal, but harmful to another species, for example, good and useful for horses, bad for cattle. Another kind of ??a?? is useful to one part of a man or animal or plant, but harmful to another part of that species. Olive oil is an example of that kind of ??a??, good on the outside of a man's body, inside the worst of evils (sc. when ill). All doctors forbid the sick to ingest olive oil, other than the smallest amount sprinkled on food, "just enough to quench the displeasure (? d?s???e?a) of the sensations in the nostrils that occur (sc. when a sick man eats) porridges and sauces." The invalid's nausea at the smell and taste of food is handily relieved by drizzling a small amount of oil on it. Unlike unremitting and excruciating pain, or good pain that results, afterwards, in greater pleasure, easily mitigated nasal displeasure is a pain that is neither good nor bad. Protagoras' d?s???e?a at Socrates' harsh treatment is a pain of that kind. By analogy, there is likely another kind of ??a??, omitted by Protagoras, that is useful to one member of a species, but harmful to another of the same species, as when one human profitably practices ?d???a against another human with impunity, thanks to her concommitant exercise of s?f??s???. Or, on a larger stage, good things that are useful to a s?f??? tyrant and his circle, but harmful to those he rules, the fruit of ?d???a exercised with s?f??s???. The sophist has eluded the cast of Socrates' net by delivering a well-received speech. Socrates protests: Protagoras should give measured answers. But this is the man whose motto is that man is the measure of all things. The sophist's metrics are infinitely elastic, except for money. He asks whether his answers should be tailored to suit him or Socrates. Socrates tries another approach: if the sophist will not agree regarding the middle or mean of the yardstick for measuring answers, perhaps he can be flattered into agreement about its ends. Praising Protagoras as able not only to speak more tersely than anyone else on the same subject, but interminably as well, Socrates asks him to exercise the former talent. Protagoras insists that he will not be ordered about. These glimpses of the sophist’s private opinion and counsel regarding the compatability of ?d???a and s?f??s??? in ruling over others indicates that Protagoras' teaching is unfit to consume. Socrates declares that it is no longer his ????? [work] to continue the conversation. He gets up to go but is prevailed upon to stay. 2. Protagoras’ and Socrates’ interpretations of Simonides’ poem (338e–347a) Afterwards, Protagoras extolls literary criticism as the greatest share of a gentleman’s education. He references a well known poem of Simonides (PMG 542), and quotes the verse "it is difficult to become truly excellent." The sophist then recites a subsequent verse in which Simonides criticizes Pittacus for expressing the same opinion, as it seems to the sophist: "it is difficult, you say, to be (sc. and remain) a good man," To the unvirtuous sophist, the distinction between becoming a virtuous man and remaining a virtuous man may well seem imperceptible. Socrates in turn offers a counter interpretation refuting Protagoras’ claim that Simonides contradicts himself, and latterly rudely deprecates displays of literary criticism at symposia as the entertainment of second-rate people. The harsh deprecation of literary criticism performed in public, which Protagoras extolled as the acme of educational attainment, seems another instance of the unpleasantnesses Socrates visits on his rival for Hippocrates’ affection. Socrates explains that Simonides’ critique of Pittacus’ saying was motivated by the former’s ambition to be numbered among the wise. To effect that ambition, Simonides refuted a wise saying of Pittacus, which was known and circulated in camera by the Seven Sages, among whom the latter was numbered. To explain the historical existence of wise sayings of the Seven Sages displayed in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, an origin myth is provided. The Seven Sages, and others even nowadays, were aware of the wisdom of the Spartans, and the Cretans, and wished to imitate them. It seems that the Spartans practice philosophy in secret, whilst feigning the state of being ignorant rustics. As proof of that assertion, Socrates provides this anecdote (342d6–e4): "For if one is willing to engage in conversation with the meanest of Spartans, generally as the conversation proceeds, one will find that he (sc. the Spartan) seems to be a mean fellow, then at some point or another in the conversation, he lets fly a noteworthy remark, brief and compact, like a skilled javelin thrower, so that his interlocuter appears no better than a child." The wise saying of the Spartan is said to be "a brief and compact remark worth noting." That formulation is echoed a few lines on in characterizing utterances of the Seven Sages as "concise remarks worthy of mention." The belief in antiquity that wise men might be recognized in their wisdom by gnomic utterances of profound thoughts, a belief reflected in the fact that those wise sayings were accepted as such, as the text reports (????a?te? ta?ta ? d? p??te? ?µ???s?? [343b2–3]), is passed over in silence by commentators who would likely dismiss the notion of true statements or wise sayings as illusory. The Simonides’ poem passage is usually taken to be an interlude or digression, unrelated t to discussions before and after, and playing no detectable role in the business of the Protagoras. I note that Simonides overthrowing Pittacus’ wise saying in PMG 542 foreshadows Socrates overthrowing Protagoras’ wise saying, after hearing it at 351b1–2. 3. Protagoras' wise saying and its aftermath (348d–359a) The poetry criticisms end. Socrates subjects Protagoras to another round of harsh invective. Socrates goes on to emphasize the collaborative aspect of philosophical inquiry (348d3–4): When one is alone and thinks about something, straightway he goes about seeking a man, until he should come upon him, to whom he might demonstrate (sc. the thought) and, with that man, ascertain (sc. whether it be true or false). An instance of such a collaboration takes place at 314c3–8, when Socrates and Hippocrates, in front of Kallias' house, pause to discuss an unidentified topic "until we agreed with one another." After stipulating that serious inquiry be collaborative, Socrates acknowledges the charm of conversation with the top sophist of the time, and calls for a rerun of their initial inquiry about ??et?. He reproduces, verbatim, Protagoras’s opinion about the parts of ??et?. The sophist readjusts the opinions he is prepared to defend. Conceding now that four of the parts of ??et? are fairly close to one another (?p?e???? pa?ap??s?a ????????), the sophist maintains that ??d?e?a is an outlier, and that it often cohabits with vice (349d6–8): "You will find many who are quite unjust (?d????) and impious (???s???) and undisciplined (????ast??) and uneducated (?µa?e??), but are exceptionally ??d?e??? (sc. in battle)." The well-travelled sophist knows the world. Socrates at the dramatic date of the Protagoras had not yet fought abroad, or observed the behavior of off-duty soldiers in bivouac. Socrates marshalls his thoughts about ??d?e?a, the part of ??et? that did not figure in the three earlier discussions. Asked whether brave men (??d?e???) are bold (?a??a????), Protagoras agrees. It is then established that ??et? is entirely a fine thing with no admixture of baseness. Base acts of anger-fed or insane boldness are excluded from being instances of ??d?e?a because, as ??d?e?a is a part of ??et?, it does not admit of baseness. Socrates asks if the sophist has seen men boldly diving into wells. Protagoras names those men, they are professional divers. Socrates asks whether they dive boldly because they have learned and know how to dive (sc. safely), or because of something else. Protagoras states that it is because they have learned that skill. And similarly for cavalrymen and for light-infantry armed with javelins. Protagoras also notes that training makes such men bolder than before they were trained. That fact Socrates knows from personal experience, for he had trained in his branch of the military, and noticed that he had become a bolder hoplite than before he had trained. Socrates asks whether the sophist has also seen men untrained in all those life-risking activities, but acting boldly in each of them. Protagoras in fact has seen extremely bold men of that sort. Socrates asks if those bold fellows are brave (??d?e???). Protagoras rejects that characterization, for naming men who act with insane recklessness brave would make ??d?e?a a shameful thing. Protagoras agrees that the brave are bold. Socrates goes on to say: On the one hand, are there those (sc. as you just said) who are bold, but not brave, and apparently insane (???? µa???µe??? fa????ta?)? On the other hand, are there others most wise (s?f?tat??) (sc. in their trained expertise as divers, cavalrymen and peltasts), who are the boldest (?a??a?e?tat??), and (sc. those trained experts who are) the boldest are the bravest (??d?e??tat??)? And, according to that argument, would (sc. not) s?f?a be ??d?e?a? Socrates expresses his thoughts in a less than precise language that suggests he might be committing an illicit conversion. Protagoras fears lest that illicit conversion be incorrectly ascribed to him. For the sophist, if the brave are the bold, it does not follow that the bold are the brave. The ambiguity of his imprecise language aside, Socrates’ equation of bravery and wisdom is open to this objection. Being brave is a necessary condition, and prior in being, to enrolling in and completing a course of training for a dangerous profession, and becoming wise therein. Cowards do not seek to become professional divers. Did Socrates not realize that he himself was brave before learning the science of the hoplite? Socrates stated at 310d2–3 that Hippocrates possesses ??d?e?a. The young man expressed his desire to acquire wisdom in joking that Protagoras has wronged him by being the only wise man and not making him one. Already brave, Hippocrates’ yearning for s?f?a is a real life refutal of Socrates' assertion that bravery and wisdom are the same thing. As it is Socrates who recounts all this, he should be aware of that counterfactual condition. It seems that the storyline requires Socrates to err here so as to provide antithesis to thesis, the latter Protagoras’ forthcoming argument that cumulates with the wise saying about ??d?e?a at 351b1–2. The sophist rejects Socrates' equation of ??d?e?a and s?f?a at 350c4–5 and proposes a definition of ??d?e?a at 351b1–2. The steps of his reasoning are these. He notes that physical strength (?s???) permits the exercise of power (d??aµ??). Further, that absent innate physical strength, power may also issue from a honorable (?a???) expertise, or from base (a?s????) insanity or base anger of those whose expertise, or state of insanity, or transient anger permits them to exceed their physical limitations. He returns to the subject of physical strength. In light of the fact that innately strong young boys perfect that gift under the tutelage of gym masters, the sophist observes that "?s??? comes from nature and its good nurture (e?t??f?a) in bodies." Finally, Protagoras infers that the a?t?a [origin] and perfection of ??d?e?a is analogous to that of ?s???, stating that "??d?e?a comes from nature, and from its good nurture in souls." The remark is expressed in eight words of Greek, brief so as to recall Socrates’ anecdote about the pithy remark of the stupid Spartan who so flustered his interlocuter with an unexpected ??µa [saying]. I submit that Protagoras' definition of ??d?e?a is an apothegm or wise saying. A passage in the Republic seems to confirm that reading. At Rep. 4.429d4 et seq. Socrates locates martial ??d?e?a in a subset of citizens, fewer than the number of metal workers; those are the guardian-soldiers of the Just City. The nature and nurture of those chosen to be guardian soldiers is likened to naturally white wool that dyers pick out from variously colored wools, and by means of a complex procedure, imbue with fast colors that do not fade even when scoured by harsh detergent. The steadfastness of the guardian-solders is like the color fastness of that dyed wool. The particulars of Socrates’ characterization of ??d?e?a are these (Rep. 4.429e8–430a4): . . . and when we choose (sc. those likely to become) soldiers (st?at??ta?) . . . educated through music and gymnastics . . . persuaded that the ??µ?? [laws] are the finest things . . . their ???? d??a [correct opinion] regarding the dreadful things (t? de???) and the other things (t? ???a) is made colorfast . . . and possessing such a gift of nature, and it having received its appropriate nurture . . . this I name and set down to be ??d?e?a. The Greek of the emphasized phrase above—d?? t? t?? te f?s?? ?a? t?? t??f?? ?p?t?de?a? ?s?????a?—echoes the sophist's characterization of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras—??d?e?a d? ?p? f?se?? ?a? e?t??f?a? t?? ????? ????eta?—in thought and vocabulary. The reprise of Protagoras' observation in the Protagoras that Socrates had heard when he was a young man is asserted authoritatively, warranting that 351b1–2 is a wise saying. Conversely, in the Laches, Nicias reproduces Socrates’ definition of ??d?e?a in the Protagoras, which replaces Protagoras’. Nicias asserts, at La. 194e–195a, that ??d?e?a is the ?p?st?µ? (s?f?a in the Protagoras) of dreadful and benign circumstances in war and elsewhere. Socrates, again in the Laches, observes that t? de??? cause fear, and that fear is the expectation of a future evil. Thus Nicias’ notion is open to the objection that his ?p?st?µ? of t? de??? concerns only the future, whereas if ??d?e?a were an ?p?st?µ?, it would bear on past, present, and future alike, as sciences do. Socrates gets Nicias to acknowledge, at La. 199e12, that he does not know what ??d?e?a is. The fact that Nicias’ definition of ??d?e?a, refuted by Socrates in Laches, and subsequently withdrawn by Nicias, is the same as that of Socrates in the Protagoras disconfirms the latter. But what if the Republic and/or the Laches had not survived? Is it possible to assess the respective merits of Protagoras' and Socrates' sayings about ??d?e?a in the Protagoras itself, aside the external evidence cited above? Protagoras' saying changes the tenor of the conversation. This is the story so far. The sophist guardedly alluded, at 316e5–317a4, to his role as consigliere to political adventurers, was pressured by Socrates into publicly offering that service at 318e5–a2 and, as it seems, condones and counsels the pairing of ?d???a with s?f??s??? in ruling over others. But Socrates' friend Hippocrates does not desire rule over others, he desires to be made wise. If the wise saying stands—it may be presumed that the young man recognizes it as such (cf. 343b2–3)—it will necessarily draw Hippocrates to follow after its author, thus dissolving his friendship with Socrates. Immediately upon the sophist uttering the wise saying, Socrates changes the subject. He asks the sophist if, in living one’s life pleasantly (?d???) until one dies, one lives well (e?), in which case living pleasantly is a good thing, and painfully a bad thing. In affirming that proposition, Protagoras adds the stipulation that the pleasant things that such a man enjoys must be honorable things (t? ?a??), not base things, if they are to be good things. The coincidence of the attributes ?a???, ??a??? and ?d? in a well-lived life, established at this point, is reprised later at 360a3, where Protagoras is led to agree that the ??d?e??? go willingly into battle because doing so is personally honorable, a good thing in that the city whose army prevails is preserved, and pleasurable. Socrates wonders why the polloi lack appetitive self-control, and err in indulging in the immediate pleasures of food, drink and sex without regard for the consequent pains of poverty and sickness. Socrates proposes that there are two kinds of pleasures and two kinds of pain. Protagoras realizes that the unpleasantnesses Socrates has been visiting on him are instances of a third kind of pain, like the nasal distress of the invalid (334b7–c6), not good, but tolerable because prospectively short term, and not bad as is excruciating and unremitting physical pain. Distinguishing between pains has made Protagoras personally safer (?sfa??ste???) throughout his life. His amendment to Socrates' theory is also ?sfa??ste??? in that it improves the theory. As it seems to the sophist, who is feeling the third kind of pain, it saves the phenomena. In view of his contribution to the previous discussion, namely his wise saying about ??d?e?a, Protagoras expects to continue playing an active role in a new discussion. He recalls Socrates' stipulation, at 348d3–4, that an inquiry be pursued collaboratively: "As you often say, Socrates, let us look at it, and if the pleasant and the good are the same, we will agree, if not, then we will dispute" 351e3–6). Socrates replies "Do you intend to lead the s?????, or am I to lead?" Protagoras courteously accedes to Socrates' intention to lead. Up to the point when Protagoras uttered his wise saying, the s????? was a vehicle of honest collaborative inquiry. The stipulation that inquiry be collaborative is now abandoned; a new protocol of leader and follower is imposed. Protagoras is summarily demoted from collaborating interlocuter to consenting auditor. Socrates commences an imaginary conversation with the polloi. He taxes them for not privileging ?p?st?µ? in making life-style choices, as he and Protagoras do; instead their notion is that pleasure overcomes them. Protagoras objects that the opinions of the polloi are not worthy of serious inquiry. Socrates reminds the sophist of their new arrangement: I lead, you follow. Socrates promises that examining the opinions of the polloi will help find out about ??d?e?a (??e??e?? pe?? ??d?e?a?), that said as though Protagoras had not just delivered a wise saying about it. The theory of the hedonic calculus is that pleasures are good, pains bad, unless contrary consequences outweigh them; in that case, the former become bad, the latter good. The lengthy hedonic calculus demonstration concludes with Socrates evoking an unidentified ?p?st?µ? to measure the pleasures of food, drink and sex against the pains of poverty and illness. The sophists’ ready acquiescence to Socrates’ proposal that they teach such an ?p?st?µ? is likely motivated by the pleasant prospect of enrolling additional students. Socrates urges the polloi to send their children to sophists to be taught an ?p?st?µ? that Hippocrates’ disciplined lifestyle indicates he already possesses. Socrates chides the polloi for being close-pursed and reluctant to fund sophists. In contrast, Socrates spoke of Hippocrates' apparent intention to spend his own and his friends’ money freely to pay Protagoras’ tuition (310e1–2). For Plato, liberality is token of a noble disposition in young men. 4. The replacement of the wise saying (359a2–360e5) The sophist is ordered to defend the proposition that ignorance (?µa??a) and ??d?e?a are compatible. (Protagoras had observed at 349d6–8 that ?µa??a is often a vice of brave soldiers). Socrates will reprise that term in the formulation of the replacement definition of ??d?e?a. Propositions previously agreed to by Protagoras "prove" Socrates’ replacement faux- wise saying. Firstly, that the attributes ??a???, ?d? and ?a??? characterize the well-lived life. Second, that all should pursue pleasure and avoid pain by employing an unidentified ?p?st?µ? for measuring one against the other. These are the steps through which Socrates forces the sophist to affirm, albeit reluctantly, the replacement definition of ??d?e?a. Asked whether cowards go after t? ?a??a??a ["things that allow boldness" ], and whether ??d?e??? go towards t? de???, Protagoras expresses the conventional opinion, that cowards run away from battle, ??d?e??? the reverse. Protagoras is asked whether ??d?e??? go into battle expecting to confront dreadful circumstances. The sophist considers that impossible, having agreed, at 351b4–c1, that one lives well in avoiding pain, that a pleasurable life is good, but enduring in pain is bad. Accordingly, by going into battle, ??d?e??? show that they do not expect to endure pain nor consider war to be terrible. Socrates goes on to say "and yet all men go also to meet what they can face boldly, whether cowardly or brave, and in this respect cowardly and brave go to meet the same things." That observation seems to refer to undertakings that allow boldness in doing them, where the distinction between cowards and ??d?e??? would not apply. Protagoras is apparently not interested in undangerous endeavors or activities. The sophist reverts to the earlier topic, saying that cowards are unwilling (sc. to go into battle), whereas ??d?e??? (sc. go) willingly. Socrates observes that going into battle is an honorable (?a???) act on the part of the soldier and a good thing (??a???) in that it preserves the city whose army prevails. Asked for the identity of those unwilling to go into battle, though it be honorable and good, Protagoras again names the cowards. To ?a??? and ??a???, which coextensively inform the act of going into battle, Socrates now adds the attribute ?d? in that good and pleasant are equivalent. Protagoras agrees that ??d?e??? believe that going into battle is good, honorable and pleasant. But Socrates placed "military campaigns" (st?ate?a?) in the list of good pains at 354a4–7. Going into battle is not pleasant. That counterfactual condition to the present argument goes unnoticed by the sophist. Socrates observes that ??d?e??? do not fear shameful fears, nor confidently engage in shameful activities. And for cowards, it is the opposite. The cause for the latter's behavior is said to be their ?????a [unawareness] and ?µa??a [ignorance]. Socrates finally produces the replacement definition. It is expressed as a ratio or proportion: the ignorance (?µa??a) of dreadful circumstances (t? de???) and benign circumstances (t? µ? de???) is to cowardice as the s?f?a of dreadful and benign circumstances are to ??d?e?a. Socrates badgers the sophist to affirm the replacement definition over and over again. Protagoras is incrementally reduced to silence. After Protagoras falls silent, Socrates badgers him for not answering. That is unpleasant. Socrates' final interrogatory (360e4–5) asks whether some men are both exceptionally brave (??d?e??tat??) and exceptionally ignorant (?µa??stat??), as Protagoras asserted earlier at 349d8. The sophist, to gratify his interlocuter, as he says, replies that the proposition seems to him impossible if one has affirmed, as he has done as a consenting auditor, the propositions of the hedonic calculus demonstration. 4. Socrates’ anecdote about Prometheus and Epimetheus (360e6–361d6) Socrates insists that he has been asking questions in order to examine every aspect of ??et? and, further, to investigate what ??et?, in and of itself, really is. And that bears on the question which he and Protagoras have both addressed at length: whether or not ??et? is teachable, Socrates initially holding the view that it is not teachable, Protagoras that it is taught by all to all. But, as Socrates says, they have traded to the other their initial opinions. The speeches themselves, laughing at their authors, explain the trade: in contrast to his initial opinion, Socrates latterly demonstrated his hedonic calculus theory (after Protagoras uttered the wise saying about ??d?e?a), according to which the akrasia of the polloi may be overcome by an unidentified ?p?st?µ? of measurement. From which it was proved that ??d?e?a is the s?f?a of t? de???. Contrariwise, Protagoras first set it down that ??et? was teachable, but now seems as eager for the opposite, declaring that it has been found to be almost everything but ?p?st?µ?. The representation by the laughing speeches of that opinion is accurate in that Protagoras observed, at 329e5–6, that there are ??d?e??? who are unjust, and that there are many who are just but not s?f??. From which it follows that all the parts of ??et? do not necessarily cohabit in a person. Further, that ??et?, which surely includes justice, cannot be reduced to ?p?st?µ? or s?f?a, if it is a fact that many do not possess s?f?a, yet practice justice as law-abiding citizens. Because of their topsy-turvy opinions on the teachability of ??et?, Socrates desires to examine the question once again. Except that he fears lest Epimetheus sabotage the inquiry. Addressing the sophist, he says "Prometheus, as you represent him in your myth, suits me more than Epimetheus, and I am imitating Prometheus to the maximum." Prometheus’ doings, as recounted by Protagoras, follow the canonical tale: the Titan stole fire and technology from Hephaistos and Athena in order to preserve mankind, was brought to trial (???p?? d??? µet???e? [322a2]), was convicted, and suffered cruel punishment. Socrates preserves a friendship at risk by imitating Prometheus, as he says. After hearing the wise saying, he argues for a hedonic calculus that divides pain into two kinds: bad because painful, and good because productive, afterwards, of more pleasure than the original pain. But the division of pain into two kinds is belied by the reality of a third intermediate kind, neither good nor bad, as in the case of the invalid's displeasure when eating, and in Protagoras' repeated displeasure at the unpleasantnesses visited on him by Socrates. After Protagoras uttered the wise saying, the s????? ceased to be a collaborative inquiry as originally stipulated. There is the contradiction between the characterization of military campaigns as painful, at 354a4, and the fact that Protagoras is induced to affirm that the ??d?e???, in going into battle, go towards what is more honorable, better and more pleasant (?p? t? ??????? te ?a? ?µe???? ?a? ?d??? [360a7–8]). Consider, also, that Aristotle found Socrates’ definition of ??d?e?a as the science of t? de??? in the Protagoras incoherent, as does Socrates in the Laches. Those particulars argue for the conclusion that the hedonic calculus demonstration, and the replacement definition of ??d?e?a imposed on Protagoras, are intellectually fraudulent, amounting to crimes committed against logos, arguments contrived for the sake of preserving a friendship, comic analogues to Prometheus' crimes against Hephaistos and Athena, committed for the sake of preserving mankind, to compare small to large. What then would be Epimetheus' dire effect on the s?????? Just as Epimetheus was unconcerned with our preservation in the distribution (?? t? d?a??µ? ?µ???se? ?µ?? [361d1–2]), so would he be unconcerned whether the friendship between Socrates and Hippocrates endures, or the young man abandons family and friends to associate with Protagoras. Epimetheus' indifference in that matter permits an impartial objectivity. Socrates fears that objective Epimethean examination of the s????? would trip it up (sf???) and trick it (??apat?sa?), in other words, negate its putative standing and negate the trickery of it being a set of specious arguments. The anecdote about Prometheus and Epimetheus represents Socrates' covert acknowledgment of the deception. 5. Protagoras’ lack of resentment and Socrates' departure (361d7–362a4) Protagoras declares that he is "least of all a resentful man" (f???e??? te ???st' ?????p??). A remark in Laws suggests that the sophist has demonstrated such a disposition. At Leg. 5.730e1–731a3, the Athenian stranger observes that s?f??s??? and f????s?? are untransferable good things, meaning that those who possess them are unable to give them to another. The stranger goes on to speak of other good things that are transferable: Some who possess a valuable thing (?t?µa) are able to share it with others, whilst keeping it for themselves. Others who possess a ?t?µa wish to share, but are unable to do so. And then there is the resentful man (t?? d? f??????ta), who is "unwilling that a commonality of good things with anyone else come to be through friendship." Accordingly, Protagoras, in uttering his wise saying, shares in a friendly way, without resentment, a ?t?µa that he possesses. After praising Socrates ("I would not be surprised were you to become one of those famous for wisdom"), Protagoras announces that the time has come to turn to something else. The dialogue terminates with the phrase ?a?t’ e?p??te? ?a? ????sa?te? ?p?µe? ["So having said and heard these things, we departed"]. The antecedent or antecedents of the plurals aside from Socrates are unnamed. It is not impossible that Socrates is referring here to the Athenian day visitors Critias, Charmides, the two sons of Pericles, Alcibiades, Phaedrus, and Eryximachos departing ensemble or serially. However, that vivid picture would contribute nothing to the storyline of the dialogue. There are two other instances of ?p?µe? in Plato. At Rep. 1.327b1, the antecedents of the plural verb in the phrase ?p?µe? p??? t? ?st? ["we departed for the city"] are known to be Socrates and Glaucon. At Euthy. 304b6–7, in the sentence preceding the phrase ?a?ta, ? ???t??, ?a? ???a ?tta ?t? ß?a??a d?a?e????te? ?p?µe? ["Having said these things, Crito, and some other brief remarks, we departed"], Socrates recounts that he asked that he and Kleinias be admitted to the sophtist brothers' school. Here too the antecedents of ?p?µe? are Socrates and a single companion, namely Kleinias. 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