THE STORYLINE OF PLATO'S PROTAGORAS*
My aim in these pages is to demonstrate that the speeches and actions in Protagoras are the moments of a complex, coherent, fully worked out storyline. Hippocrates intends to abandon family and friends, of whom Socrates is one, in order to associate with Protagoras. Later, at the conference of sophists taking place at Kallias’ house, concerned whether Hippocrates’ soul would be harmed by Protagoras’ teaching, Socrates engages the sophist in order to determine the latter’s bona fides. Socrates’ testing indicates that Protagoras privately believes that one may commit ?d???a [injustice] while exercising s?f??s??? [prudence] in so doing, though the sophist refuses to agree to that proposition in public. In the second half of the dialogue, a remark of Protagoras’ effects a turning point in the discussion. Socrates recognizes that the sophist’s characterization of ??d?e?a [courage], at Prt. 351b1?2, that it comes from nature and from the good nurture (sc. of that nature) in souls, is an apothegm or wise saying. Hippocrates does not intend to associate with Protagoras for the sake of achieving political power, but to acquire the sophist’s wisdom. Protagoras’ wise saying must be made to disappear, lest it draw Hippocrates to follow after its Pied Piper author, thus dissolving his friendship with Socrates. Henceforth, the sophist is forbidden to play a collaborative role in the inquiry: Socrates will lead, Protagoras is to follow. Socrates evokes an ?p?st?µ? [science] of measuring pains against pleasures, to be taught by sophists to the intemperate polloi to overcome their acrasia. Hippocrates’ daylong pursuit of the fugitive slave Satyrus indicates his exemplary self-discipline and that he is the master of his desires. Hippocrates already possesses the ?p?st?µ? that Socrates urges on the polloi. Making use of propositions agreed to by Protagoras in the hedonic calculus passage, Socrates forces him step by step to accept a replacement of his wise saying. By foisting on Protagoras and the other sophists the teaching of an ?p?st?µ? that
* I follow the texts of Burnet, J. 1901?06. Platonis opera. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Bywater, I. 1920. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Oxford: Clarendon Press; and Walzer, R. R. 1991. Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Translations of the Greek are mine unless otherwise indicated. A version of this paper was read at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Philological Association at St. Louis.
Hippocrates already possesses, and “unsaying,” as it were, Protagoras’ wise saying, Socrates removes the proximate reasons for his friend to associate with Protagoras. Socrates leaves Kallias' house with the young man, their friendship preserved.
1. The testing of Protagoras (Prt. 309?335b)
Socrates encounters an unnamed acquaintance to whom he recounts the events of the day. Hippocrates had awakened Socrates before daybreak. He informs Socrates that Protagoras arrived in Athens yesterday, which Hippocrates only learned of late at night, for he had spent the daylight hours in the countryside, chasing after a runaway slave. The young man’s daylong pursuit of Satyrus through the countryside is evidence of his self-discipline. The fugitive slave’s name suggests that Hippocrates is the master of his desires, in contrast to the polloi whose intemperence Socrates addresses later on.
Socrates corrects the young man. Protagoras actually arrived two days ago. Socrates has already attended the first full day of discussions at Kallias' house.1
Hippocrates means to dissolve his relations with family and friends, of whom Socrates
is one,2 in order to associate with Protagoras, not out of political ambition,3 but to be made wise.
1 This may be inferred from the fact that Socrates does not introduce himself when he first speaks to Protagoras, at Prt. 316b1?2, and that the sophist, a few lines on, addresses Socrates by name. Cf. Denyer 2008, 87, "Protagoras obviously remembers Socrates' name from some previous meeting."
2 Socrates identifies himself as a friend of Hippocrates in referring to “we, your friends” (?µ?? t?? ?ta????) at Prt. 313b1. A close degree of intimacy is indicated by Hippocrates sitting down on the cot where Socrates had been sleeping, as well as excusing himself for neglecting to inform Socrates of his itinerary of the previous day. Later, Socrates and Hippocrates pause outside Kallias’ house to finish a thought at Prt. 314c3?7, which suggests a comfortable familiarity that includes collaborative inquiry into serious matters.
3 Perhaps influenced by Protagoras’ declaration at Prt. 318e5?319a2 that he teaches his student how to wield supreme power in his city, it is usually assumed that Hippocrates’ desire to associate with the sophist is based on political ambition. See e.g. Bartlett 2003, 613,“. . . he (sc. Hippocrates) wishes to become the student of Protagoras evidently because he believes that acquiring such wisdom or skill himself is essential to fulfilling his political ambition to his becoming ‘held in high regard in the city’ (310e6?7; 316b10?cl).” Bartlett is overreading ??????µ?? ?e??s?a? ?? t? p??e?, as the sophist’s response indicates: “Socrates, you have correctly devined my
intention (sc. to conduct a discussion for all to hear).” Were Hippocrates’ ambition political, his interview with
The young man jokes that the sophist has wronged him "because he is the only wise man and doesn't make me one" (Prt. 310d5?6).
Socrates warns of the danger of being poisoned by what is on offer from sophists. Just as grocers sell food for the body, some of it perchance spoiled, sophists sell food for the soul.
Unlike provisions from the market, which may be carried off and tested by experts in the kitchen, the latter must be consumed immediately upon purchase.
Later, at Kallias' house, Socrates presents himself and Hippocrates to Protagoras. Asked by the sophist, who does not yet know why they have come, whether they prefer to confer privately or in public, Socrates replies that “It is indifferent to us. Hear what we have come for, and you decide.” Asked to say what it is for which they have come, Socrates suppresses the real reason, that Hippocrates wishes to become wise. Instead he speaks of Hippocrates’ wealthy and distinguished background, stating that the young man seems to him to desire (?p???µe??) to become well-spoken of in the city (??????µ?? ?e??s?a? ?? t? p??e?), and that state of affairs he imagines would certainly happen, were he to associate with Protagoras. Socrates turns Protagoras’ question around, bidding the sophist “Now do consider, concerning these things (pe?? a?t??),” i.e. Hippocrates’ wealthy background and his desire to become well-spoken of by his fellow citizens, “whether you deem it necessary to consult privately one on one, or openly before others.” It seems that the intentions of some prospective students must be examined in privacy, as in the case of nephews and protégés of rulers (discussed below). As Protagoras desires to give a public demonstration, he thanks Socrates for providentially bringing someone seemingly without grandiose political ambitions, whose prospective association with him may be discussed openly.
The sophist goes on to describe himself as a foreigner who trawls the great cities, persuading the best young men to abandon their usual intercourse with friends and family. These alienations of affection cause resentments (f?????), unpleasantnesses (d?sµ??e?a?), and even plots (?p?ß???a?) against him. Doing what he does puts him in existential danger from
deadly enemies. Who are these violent men? Their identity is not far to seek. It seems that
Protagoras would need to be confidential.
Homer, Hesiod, and other sophists, fearing resentment, disguised what they were up to as best they could. But it did not escape the notice of the rulers of the cities (t??? d??aµ????? ?? ta?? p??es? p??tte??). What they noticed is not stated. I suggest that the rulers noticed that promising young men in their inner circles, closely bound to them by ties of friendship and family, but impatient to rule in their stead, were engaging in private consultations with new associates.4
The audience seated, Socrates is asked to say again what he said before, that Hippocrates desires to become well-spoken of in the city. Instead, Socrates asks what the young man will get from associating with Protagoras. The sophist promises that he will get what he came for. Socrates presses him5 to say exactly what that might be. Protagoras' µ???µa [teaching] is for managing optimally one's estate "and that one might be the most powerful in the things of the city in doing and speaking" (?p?? t? t?? p??e?? d??at?tat?? ?? e?? ?a? p??tte?? ?a? ???e??). Later on, at Prt. 354b4?5, "rule over others" (????? ???a?) and "wealth" (p???t??) terminate a list of pleasures. The former is a lapidary phrase, capturing in two words the essence of being preeminent in the affairs of the city in speaking in favor of one's agenda and effecting it; the latter term names the telos of Protagoras' teaching of how best to manage one's estate.
Socrates closes off the prospect of wealth and rule over others by recasting Protagoras'
µ???µa into a harmless platitude, that the sophist's teaching is the science of politics and making men into good citizens. That, Protagoras replies, is precisely6 what he teaches. Earlier,
4 Conspiracy against them is an ongoing danger to rulers, so actionable intelligence regarding conspirators is of paramount concern. The future tyrant Critias defines s?f??s??? in part as a unilateral knowledge of what the others are thinking at Chrm. 167a1?5. See Eisenstadt 2008: 495.
5 See Bartlett 2003: 616, “Only under pressure from Socrates does Protagoras state more or less candidly the nature of his instruction . . . .”
6 See Taylor 1976: 71, "We find it startling that Socrates should equate teaching the art of how to run a city with making men into good citizens, and that Protagoras should accept this equation." Similarly, Bartlett 2003: 614, “It is certainly true that Socrates immediately imposes on Protagoras the most respectable interpretation of his remarks possible—to the effect that Protagoras teaches the political art and good citizenship, words that had never
Socrates spoke of the danger of purchasing food for the soul from a sophist that must be consumed immediately; here, in effect, he has carried it off uneaten to be tested, as it were in
Socrates denies that ??et? [excellence] is teachable. He offers two arguments, the first easily refuted. He cites apparently contradictory rules followed by the Athenians when meeting in the ekklesia. On the one hand, they accept advice on technical issues only from competent professionals trained by known teachers. On the other hand, any citizen may offer advice about managing the city’s affairs (pe?? t?? t?? p??e?? d?????se??), whether rich or poor, aristocrat or menial, without being asked who taught him d??a??s??? [justice] and s?f??s??? [prudence], which are required to advise competently on matters of policy. Socrates concludes that the Athenians believe that ??et? is not teachable because, unlike the case of professionally trained experts, a citizen cannot name the teacher whom he learned it from. As Protagoras points out in his speech, the contradiction disappears when one takes into account the fact that citizens acquire those twin aspects of ??et?, not by paying experts to teach it to them, but by emulating their elders, and through long practice, each eventually deeming himself expert in making just and prudent policy decisions.
Socrates' stronger argument for the thesis that ??et? is not teachable rests on the unquestionable fact that men of great excellence, such as Pericles, appear from time to time, and are recognized in their accomplishments by their contemporaries to possess ??et? in full. Yet they have no known teacher of their excellence, nor are they able to transmit it to their sons. Accordingly, ??et? is not teachable.
In the speech that follows, Protagoras commends the practice of having children read
poetry about great and good men of old "so that the child be zealous to imitate them and to strive to become such as they were," but he does not address the deep question of how great
passed Protagoras' lips—just as it is true that Protagoras happily concedes this to be what he publicly pronounces
or ‘professes’ (319a6?7).” Protagoras is not happy. Socrates has pressured Protagoras at length (Prt. 318b1?d4) into revealing the maximalist programme of his µ???µa. Because it is safer to discuss such matters with a prospective associate in private, the sophist apparently regrets its public disclosure, and elects to unsay it, as it were, by endorsing warmly Socrates' innocuous substitution.
men come to possess ??et? in full. The sophist observes that citizens assiduously inculcate a
lesser, demotic ??et? into their children. (Socrates uses the same language, at Phdr. 82a11?b3, to praise highly "those who practice a demotic and civic ??et? that they call s?f??s??? and d??a??s???, which [sc. demotic and civic ??et?] comes to be from habit and practice, without philosophy or reason"). The inculcation of demotic justice into children is reinforced with threats, beatings and the prospect of worse. Protagoras' opinion that man is unjust in his nature fuels his account of the origin of mankind, told in the form of a myth. The impending extirpation of mankind, whose lawlessness towards one another prevented concerted resistance against packs of predator animals, and rendered living together in cities impossible, was averted by Zeus' contrivance: in order that they might live together in cities, all must be coerced to be just towards one another.
Socrates has reported the entirety of Protagoras’ speech. Some propositions he agrees with, others not. It may be safely assumed that he is in agreement that ?s??t?? [reverence for the gods] is innate in man. And that the particulars of d??a??s??? in democratic cities like Athens are specified and ratified by the will of the people, as is shown by the metaphor, at Prt. 330c6, where Socrates solicits a vote for the proposition that justice is just. Socrates also believes that reverence for the gods (?s??t??) and the practice of d??a??s??? are often closely intertwined in city life, as is illustrated by Protagoras’ method for exacting delinquent payment of tuition (discussed below). Contrariwise, Socrates does not agree with Protagoras' characterization of justice as a coercive Social Contract. Protagoras paired d??? [law] with a?d?? [shame], the sophist asserting that conjointly with their lawless attitude towards others, men are naturally shameless. Earlier that day, the dramatic detail of Hippocrates blushing in the dark, at Prt. 312a2, indicates that a?d?? may awaken autonomously. This real world event argues against the notion that mankind is naturally shameless. Likewise, the fact that men possessing ??et? in full appear from time to time argues against the notion that all men would, if they could, behave lawlessly towards others.
Socrates intends to test the sophist's wares which he has carried off for inspection.
Aside the charm of the origin myth, and the logos of civilization that it entails, it remains to be determined whether or not, according to Protagoras' teaching about ruling over others, the s?f??? [prudent] ruler practices justice. Socrates’ methodology for testing the sophist in that regard proceeds by indirection. Pairs of abstractions are examined: d??a??s??? and ?s??t??, s?f??s??? and s?f?a [wisdom], and ?d???a and s?f??s???. I note that the penultimate abstraction is not d??a??s???, as is usually asserted, but its negation. The word d??a??s??? or cognate forms do not occur in the third comparison, in contrast to ?d????, ?d??e?, ?d????s??, and ?d?????te?, the latter occurring twice. Following Kahn,7 I read the third discussion, not as a testing of propositions, but as a testing of Protagoras the man.
In a preliminary interrogatory, Socrates elicits Protagoras’ theory of ??et?, that its parts are different from one another, and have different functions, as different as the mouth's function
is to that of the eyes, and are unlike pieces of gold, which differ only in largeness and smallness,
and that having one part does not imply that one has another part, unlike parts of the face.8
Socrates states a contrary view, that “all the names (sc. of the parts of ??et?) reference the same
unitary existent thing” (p??ta ???µata t?? a?t?? ???? ??t?? [Prt. 321d1]). That idea is duplicated at Prt. 349b2?3, again in contrast to the sophist's opinions, that "there are five names (sc. d??a??s???, ?s??t??, s?f??s???, s?f?a, ??d?e?a) that inhere in the unitary practice (sc. of ??et?)" (p??te ??ta ???µata, ?p? ??? p???µat? ?st??). Finally, in his summary of the dialogue at Prt. 361b1?2, Socrates reprises a curtailed version of Prt. 321d1 and Prt. 348b2?3, saying that he has been “attempting to demonstrate that ?p?st?µ? is pretty much everything, namely d??a??s??? and s?f??s??? (sc. in the first discussion), and ??d?e?a (sc. in the last discussion).”
The extensive literature on Socrates' so-called Unity of the Virtues proposition in Protagoras, 9 stated at Prt. 321d1, and reprised at Prt. 348b2?3, treats it as a decontextualized
standalone proposition. Not surprisingly, no consensual explanation of it has been forthcoming.
7 See Kahn 1996: 97, "The elenchus described in the Apology is a testing of persons, not propositions. (This conception of the elenchus is occasionally expressed in the dialogues, for instance at Laches 1877E?188B and Protagoras 333C [. . .])."
8 A face without nose or mouth is not a face.
9 See e.g. Allen 1970: 82, 93?100; Vlastos 1972: 415?458/1981: 221?269; Penner 1973; Taylor 1976: 103?108; Denyer 2008: 122?123.
This much may be said: Prt. 321d1 and Prt. 348b2?3 represent precisely the negation of
Protaoras' opinion, that one may possess some aspects of ??et? and not others, a complementarity which suggests that the latter notion may have dictated the composition of the former.
According to Protagoras, the words d??a??s???, ?s??t??, s?f??s???, s?f?a and ??d?e?a name different human activities or capacities, conjoined or not as may be. As he says
(Prt. 329e5?6), many are ??d?e??? [courageous], but unjust, and (sc. many) are just, but not wise. The first pair of uncongenial dispositions reminds that the primitive men of the myth would have exercised ??d?e?a in killing or fending off a dangerous animal, singulatim, with firebrand or farm implement. But in the war against packs of predator animals, they were the weaker because, lacking justice vis-ŕ-vis their fellow soldiers, they did not come to one another's defense. It is also represented in the speech that the innate10 disposition of men to reverence the gods (?s??t??) existed in mythical time, anterior to historical time11 when cities were established and justice came into existence.
The overview of Protagoras’ opinions concluded, Socrates initiates a series of discussions.
In the first discussion, Socrates observes and Protagoras concurs that the words ?s??t?? and d??a??s??? each name a specific practice (p???µa) exercised by civilized men. Socrates argues that the eponymous attribute of ?s??t?? applies to d??a??s??? and vice versa. Protagoras is not entirely in agreement. In the myth, the aition of ?s??t?? was described as radically different from the aition of d??a??s???. However, in present-day city life, those parts of ??et? may be practiced in concert, as illustrated by the sophist’s procedure, at Prt. 328b4?c2, for exacting delinquent payment of his tuition:
And (sc. my teaching) is worth the price (µ?s???) I set and even more, as it seems
to a student. Which relates to the way I collect the µ?s???. For whenever someone learns
10 Cf. Prt. 322a4: mankind alone worshipped gods "through consanguinity with deity" (d?? t?? t?? ?e?? s?????e?a?).
11 See Wilamowitz 1920: 1.13, "Es ist eine fundamentale Tatsache, die nie vergessen werden darf, so oft es auch geschieht, daß die Moral im Zusammenleben der Menschen entsteht, anders als der Glaube an die Götter, die selbst erst spät von den Menschen zu moralischen Wesen umgebildet werden."
my teaching, if willing, he pays12 the price that I set. If unwilling, he is led into a temple where he swears to the god that he is (sc. honestly) declaring how much the teaching is
worth, and pays that price.
It seems that docile students paid the set price, others quibbled about the price, and some flat
out refused to pay. Protagoras considers the latter to be acting unjustly towards him, making him the victim of ?d???a. This is his strategem to avoid being mulcted. The unjust refusal to pay for value received in the secular world goes by the board by leading the debtor into a temple
where, in fear of divine retribution for swearing an oath falsely in the house of the god, he declares the true worth of the teaching, and pays up. In transactions of this sort, ?s??t?? and d??a??s??? are copresent, and the act is biconditionally just and pious.
Protagoras proposes that Socrates' proposition be assumed for the sake of argument: "Let us assume that d??a??s??? is ?s??? and ?s??t?? is d??a???." Socrates forbids Protagoras the use of hypotheticals. To this diktat, Protagoras replies that everything may be hypothesized: "in one way or another, all things are the same as everything else." Accordingly, even opposites like black and white, hard and soft, have some degree of likeness. Socrates dares Protagoras to say that piety and justice have as little in common as black and white. "Not so, he replies, at all,
nor yet, on the other hand, as I believe you regard them."13 Socrates intuits the sophist’s feelings that fuel these words, and reveals them to the audience: "You seem to me to be in a state of displeasure as regards our conversation" (d ? s ? e ? ? ? d??e?? µ?? ? ? e ? ? p??? t??t?). Socrates' diktat and his subsequent remarks are apparently instances of the unpleasantnesses Protagoras spoke of earlier, at Prt. 316d2?3, that he typically experiences at the hands of those
who, like Socrates, resent the prospect of losing an intimate to the sophist’s circle. Thus
Protagoras’ state of d?s???e?a.
12 See Goodwin 1890: 53, Chapter 154, "The aorist and sometimes the perfect indicative are used in animated language to express general truths. These are called the gnomic aorist and the gnomic perfect, and are usually to be translated by our present." In the following chapter, Goodwin cites Prt. 328b4?c2 as illustrating this usage: "Here the perfect and aorist, according to the MSS., are used in nearly the same sense, he pays."
13 Lamb's translation (1924: 161).
In the second discussion, Socrates states that it is necessarily the case that a thing have only one opposite thing. Consequently, s?f?a and s?f??s??? are identical because the same
thing is their opposite, namely “thoughtlessness” (?f??s???). Protagoras agrees very
reluctantly (?a? µ??’ ????t??) to that dubious argument.
Socrates recapitulates the conclusions of the prior discussions: "Then s?f??s??? and
s?f?a would be one? And before that, we saw that d??a??s??? and ?s??t?? were virtually the same."
The subsequent discussion (Prt. 333b7?335c7) has been interpreted as an ultimately aborted attempt by Socrates to prove that d??a??s??? is the same as s?f??s???.14 The text
14 See Schleiermacher 1836: 87, "Socrates . . . forces from him (sc. Protagoras) in a second course the confession that discretion (sc. s?f??s???) also and wisdom must be identical, and at length is on the point of proving the same of justice (sc. that d??a??s??? is identical with s?f??s???), when Protagoras violently starting off in order to break the thread, brings forward a long, but exclusively empirical discussion upon the nature of the Good”; Grote 1888: 2, 280, "Meanwhile [. . .] Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice (d??a??s???) and moderation (s?f??s???) are identical”; Adam 1893: 136, "If d??a??s??? = ?s??t?? and s?f??s??? = s?f?a it remains to identify either d??a??s??? or ?s??t?? with either s?f??s??? or s?f?a in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that d??a??s??? = s?f??s???”; Sullivan 1961: 16, “Socrates now begins the equation of s?f??s??? and d??a??s???, incidentally forcing Protagoras to defend a thesis which he is ashamed to affirm — the common view that one may exercise self-control in injustice”; Allen 1970: 95, ". . . the third (sc. discussion) (333d-334a), which is interrupted without reaching its conclusion, would have maintained the unity of justice and temperance”; Vlastos 1974: 416, n.1/1981, 221, n.1, "The defense is presented in the form of separate arguments for the unity of four pairs of virtues: (1) Justice and Piety (330B6?331E6); (2) Wisdom and Temperance (332A4?333B6); (3) Temperance and Justice (333B8?334C6); (4) Courage and Wisdom (349D2?350C5)”; Guthrie 1975: 4.218, “Without pause he starts on the relationship between justice and self-control (or however we translate sophrosyne . . .) .”; Taylor 1976: 131, "333b7?334a2 Socrates begins an argument to prove the identity of justice with sophrosune”; Frede, D. 1986: 732, “Socrates . . . points out in three successive arguments that (1) justice must be the same as piety (330c?32a), (2) wisdom the same as prudence or self-control (332a?33b), and (3) justice the same as self-control (333b?34a)”; Frede, M. 1992: xxvi, “Next follows an argument that wisdom and temperance are the same (332a3?333b6), and the beginning of an argument that justice and temperance go together (333b ff.), which however Protagoras does not allow to arrive at a formal conclusion . . . . “; Manuwald 1999: 271, "333b7?334c6 Sokrates setzt dazu an, sophrosyne und Gerechtigkeit als identisch zu erweisen, jedoch kommt die Argumentation wegen längerer Ausfuhrungen des Protagoras über die Vielfältigkeit
suggests otherwise. The word d??a??s??? does not occur in this passage; ?d???a and cognates
occur five times.
Socrates predicts that it is now the turn of Protagoras himself to submit to being tested. The sophist discountenances such an examination, alleging that it would be displeasing (t ? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?t??t? d ? s ? e ? ? e??a? [Prt. 333d1?2]), but eventually agrees to answer.
Socrates asks Protagoras “whether it seems to you that an unjust man might exercise
s?f??s???, whilst committing injustice” (??? t?? s?? d??e? ?d???? ?????p?? s?f???e??, ?t? ?d??e?;). Protagoras replies "I would be ashamed to agree, although there are
many who say this." The usual reading of this exchange is that Protagoras disagrees15 with the
proposition. But the sophist has already approvingly cited, at Prt. 323b2?7, in the speech, the
view which he is now ashamed to call his own: ". . . if it is known that someone is ?d???? (unjust), and if he says the truth about himself before others, what was deemed to be s?f??s??? elsewhere, here is insanity: everyone agrees that all must say they are d??a??? [just], whether they are so or not . . . ."
Socrates repeats the question. "Do some men seem to you to be s?f???, whilst practicing
und Relativität des Nützlichen und Guten nicht zum Abschluß"; Denyer 2008: 132, "Socrates starts to present an argument that temperance and justice are a single thing."
15 See Adam 1893: 137, "Protagoras' own opinion" is "that ?d???a is not compatible with s?f??s???;" Nestle 1910: 97, "Protagoras bekennt sich als Gegner der weitverbreiteten Lehre vom Naturrecht des Stärkeren, die auf eine völlige Umwertung aller sittlichen Werte hinauslief [Thuk. III 82]. . . ;" Ritter 1910: 1.322, "Die Frage, ob ihm etwa ein ungerecht Handelnder eben damit Besonnenheit zu betätigen scheine, verneint er zwar für sich ganz entschieden;" Pohlenz 1913: 99n3, "Protagoras selber bekennt als seine Ansicht ?t? ??de?? ?d???? s?f???e? [333c], was uns nach dem Mythos nicht verwundern kann"; Vlastos 1956: viii, "But he (sc. Plato) also makes it clear that, unlike some salesmen, this one has moral inhibitions. Protagoras refuses to admit that everyone agrees that all must say they are d??a???, whether they are so or not . . . ;" Sprague 1967: 2, Protagoras' "own opinion" is "that acts of injustice are intemperate;" Guthrie 1975: 4.218, “Can a wrong-doer be said to employ this virtue (sc. s?f??s???)? Prot. thinks not, though many people believe it”; Manuwald 1999: 272, "Protagoras’ verwahrt sich gegen diese Ansicht (sc. that ?d???a and s?f??s??? are compatible), die er als verbreitet bezeichnet . . . ." An exception is Paul Friedländer 1957: 2.16. Friedländer poses this question: "Aber wenn Protagoras sich nun herbeiläßt die Meinung (sc. that ?d???a and s?f??s??? are compatible) der Vielen gesprachsweise zu vertreten, so wird man sich fragen, ob er sie nicht auch im Erneste vertreten könnte."
Protagoras: ?st?, ?f? [“Let it be so!” he said]. The sophist affirms the proposition hypothetically.
Socrates: "And you agree that safe thinking (s?f???e??) is the same as thinking well (e? f???e??)?”
Protagoras: ?f? [he agreed]. The sophist affirms this in his own voice.
Socrates: "And that thinking well (e? f???e??) is (sc. the same as) planning well (e? ß???e?es?a?), whilst practicing ?d???a?"
Protagoras: ?st?, ?f? [“Let it be so!” he said].
E?ß????a is surely what Protagoras teaches (cf. Prt. 318e5), but the reappearance of the
condition "whilst practicing ?d???a" forces him, again, to answer hypothetically. Socrates'
repetition, retraction, and reinsertion of the damning phrase drives the sophist to frame his
his answers alternatively in third person hypothetical or first person indicative. This is
embarassingly revelatory of Protagoras’ private opinion that ?d???a and s?f??s??? are
Socrates lobs him a softball: ??te???, ?? d’ ???, e? e? p??tt??s?? ?d?????te? ? e? ?a???; [“Whether acting unjustly is doing well or doing poorly?”]. The syntax permits Progaoras to reply simply e? e? [“Doing well”], thereby obscuring whether he is affirming the transgressive proposition in propria voce or hypothesizing it.
Socrates and Protagoras agree that good things exist. The sophist delivers a speech on
the different kinds of ??a?? [good things]. The first kind of ??a?? is useful to one species of animal, but harmful to another species, for example, good and useful for horses, bad for cattle.
A second kind of ??a?? is useful to one part of a man or animal or plant, but harmful to
another part of that species. Olive oil is an example of that kind of ??a??, good on the
outside of a man's body, inside the worst of evils (sc. when ill). All doctors forbid the sick to ingest olive oil, other than the smallest amount sprinkled on food, "just enough to quench the
displeasure (? d?s???e?a) of the sensations in the nostrils that occur (sc. when a sick man eats) porridges and sauces." The invalid's nausea at the smell and taste of food is handily relieved by
drizzling a small amount of oil on it. Unlike unremitting and excruciating pain, or good pain
that results, afterwards, in greater pleasure, easily mitigated nasal displeasure is a pain that is
neither good nor bad. Protagoras' d?s???e?a at Socrates' harsh treatment is a pain of that kind.
By analogy, there is likely a third kind of ??a??, omitted by Protagoras, that is useful to
one member of a species, but harmful to another of the same species, as when one man profitably practices ?d???a against another man with impunity, thanks to his concommitant exercise of s?f??s???. Or, on a larger stage, good things that are useful to the s?f??? tyrant and his circle, but harmful to those he rules, the fruit of ?d???a exercised with s?f??s???.
The sophist has eluded the cast of Socrates' net by delivering a well-received speech.
Socrates protests: Protagoras should give measured answers. But this is the man whose motto is "Man the measure of all things!" The sophist's metrics are infinitely elastic, except for money. He asks whether his answers should be tailored to suit him or Socrates. Socrates tries another approach: if the sophist will not agree regarding the middle or mean of the yardstick for measuring answers, perhaps he can be flattered into agreement about its ends. Praising Protagoras as able not only to speak more tersely than anyone else on the same subject (cf. Grg. 449bc) but interminably as well, Socrates asks him to exercise the former talent. Protagoras insists that he will not be ordered about.
This glimpse of the sophist’s private opinion and confidential counsel regarding the
compatability of ?d???a and s?f??s??? indicates that Protagoras' µ???µa is unfit to consume. Socrates declares that it is no longer his ?????16 [work] to continue the conversation. He gets up to go but is prevailed upon to stay.
2. Protagoras’ and Socrates’ interpretations of Simonides’ poem (Prt. 338e?347a)
Afterwards, Protagoras extolls literary criticism as the greatest share of a gentleman’s
education. He proceeds to find fault with a well known poem of Simonides (PMG 542),17
by criticizing the poet for contradicting himself. He quotes Simonides’ own opinion: “it is difficult to become truly excellent” (??d?’ ??a??? µ?? ??a???? ? e ? ? s ? a ? ?a?ep??).
16 This is the mid-point of the dialogue: slightly more than 27 Stephanus pages separate Prt. 335b2 from the beginning of Protagoras and from its end.
17 Page, 1962: 282.
Protagoras then faults Simonides for criticizing Pittacus for expressing the same opinion, as it
seems to the sophist: “it is difficult, you say, to be (sc. and remain) a good man” (?a?ep?? f?t’ ?s???? ? µ µ e ? a ?). To the unvirtuous sophist, the distinction between becoming a virtuous man and remaining a virtuous man may well seem imperceptible.
Socrates in turn offers a counter interpretation refuting Protagoras’ claim that Simonides
contradicts himself, and latterly rudely deprecates displays of literary criticism at symposia as the entertainment of second-rate men. The deprecation of literary criticism performed in public, that Protagoras extolls as the height of educational attainment, seems another instance of the unpleasantnesses Socrates visits on his rival for Hippocrates’ affection.
The Simonides’ poem passage is customarily read as an interlude or digression, unrelated to discussions before and after, and playing no detectable role in the business of Protagoras. That is not entirely so. Socrates’ anecdote here about the stupid Spartan drives the storyline forward by providing a hint for recognizing the significance of Protagoras’ remark later at Prt. 351b1?2. Socrates explains that Simonides’ critique of Pittacus’ saying was motivated by the former’s ambition to be numbered among the wise. To effect that ambition, Simonides refuted a wise saying of Pittacus, which was known and circulated in camera by the Seven Sages, among whom the latter was numbered. To explain the historical existence of wise sayings of the Seven Sages displayed in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, Socrates provides an origin myth, analogous to the myth in Protagoras’ great speech that provides the grounds for the constitutional systems of cities in historical times. According to Socrates, the Seven Sages, and others even nowadays, were aware of the wisdom of the Spartans, and the Cretans, and wished to imitate them. It seems that the Spartans practise philosophy in secret, whilst feigning the state of being ignorant rustics. As proof for that assertion, Socrates provides this anecdote (Prt. 342d6?e4): “For if one is willing to engage in conversation with the meanest of Spartans, generally as the conversation proceeds, one will find that he (sc. the Spartan) seems to be a mean fellow, then at some point or another in the conversation, he lets fly a noteworthy remark, brief and compact, like a skilled javelin thrower, so that his interlocuter appears no better than a child.” The wise saying of the Spartan is said to be “a brief and compact remark worth noting” (??µa ????? ????? ß?a?? ?a? s??est?aµµ????). That formulation is echoed a few lines below in characterizing utterances of the Seven Sages as “concise remarks worthy of mention” (??µata ß?a??a ????µ??µ??e?ta [Prt. 343a7?8]). The belief in antiquity that wise men might be recognized in their wisdom by gnomic utterances of profound thoughts,18 a belief reflected in the fact that those wise sayings were accepted as such, as the text reports (????a?te? ta?ta ? d? p??te? ?µ???s?? [Prt. 343b2?3]), may seem naive to the sceptical modern mentality for whom the concept of truth and true statements are problematic. In the prise of that prejudice, Protagoras’ remark at Prt. 351b1?2 is ignored by commentators or dismissed as confused.
3. Protagoras' wise saying and its aftermath (Prt. 348d?359a)
The poetry criticisms end. Socrates subjects Protagoras to another round of harsh invective (xx-xx). He goes on to point out the collaborative aspect of philosophical inquiry (Prt. 348d3?4): "When one is alone and thinks about something, straightway he goes about seeking a man, until he should come upon him, to whom he might demonstrate (sc. the thought) and, with that man, ascertain (sc. whether it be true or false)."19 An instance of such a collaboration takes place at Prt. 314c3?8, when Socrates and Hippocrates, in front of Kallias' house, pause to discuss an unidentified topic “until we agreed with one another”(??? s???µ?????saµe? ????????).
After stipulating that serious inquiry be collaborative, Socrates acknowledges the charm of conversation with the top sophist of the time, and calls for a rerun of their initial inquiry about ??et?. He reproduces, essentially verbatim, Protagoras’s opinions about the parts of ??et?. The sophist changes the viewpoint that he is prepared to defend. Conceding now that four of the parts of ??et? are fairly close to one another (?p?e???? pa?ap??s?a ????????), the sophist maintains that ??d?e?a is an outlier, and that it often cohabits with vice (Prt. 349d6?8): "You will find many who are quite unjust (?d????) and impious (???s???) and undisciplined (????ast??) and uneducated (?µa?e??), but are exceptionally ??d?e??? (sc. in battle).”
18 Cf. St. Augustine Confessiones VII, 19 “. . . at one time, to put forth wise thoughts in words, at another, to remain silent” (nunc proferre per signa sapientes sententias, nunc esse in silentio).
19 Like the d?sµ??e?a? [unpleasantnesses] that Socrates visits on the sophist, the stipulation at Prt. 348d3?4 that a d?a???µa [thought] be confirmed as true or false in collaboration with another person, and the abrogation of that stipulation at Prt. 351e8?9, are moments of the storyline.
Socrates marshalls his thoughts about ??d?e?a, the part of ??et? that did not figure in the three earlier discussions. Asked whether brave men (??d?e???) are bold (?a??a????), Protagoras agrees. (There follows a seemingly intrusive exchange about ??et?: the interlocuters agree that ??et? is entirely a fine thing with no admixture of baseness). Socrates asks if the sophist has seen men boldly diving into wells. Protagoras names these men, they are professional divers. Socrates asks whether they dive boldly because they have learned and know (?p?sta?ta?) how to dive (sc. with expertise) or through something else. Protagoras confirms that they know (?p?sta?ta?) (sc. to dive with expertise). And likewise for cavalrymen and for light-infantry armed with javelins. Protagoras also notes that training makes such men bolder than before they were trained. That fact Socrates knows from personal experience, for he had trained in his branch of the military,20 and had become a bolder hoplite than before he was trained. Socrates asks whether the sophist has also seen men untrained in all those life-risking activities, but acting boldly in each of them. Protagoras in fact has seen extremely bold men of that sort. Socrates asks if those bold fellows are brave (??d?e???). To Protagoras, that would make ??d?e?a a shameful thing. Socrates: “How then do you say about the brave (t??? ??d?e????)? Do you not say that those are bold (t???21 ?a??a?????)?” Protagoras: “I still do” (?a? ??? ?’, ?f?). Socrates: “On the one hand, are there those (sc. as you said) who are bold, but not brave, and apparently insane (???? µa???µe??? fa????ta?)? On the other hand, are there others most wise (s?f?tat??) (sc. in their specialties as divers, cavalrymen and peltasts), and
20 How he managed to train is unknown. Cf. van Wees 2004, 94, "But they (sc. hoplites) were not, however, subjected to any regular programme of training: in an anecdote set in the late fifth cenury, when he himself was growing up, Xenophon has Socrates say to an unfit youug man; just because the city offers no public military training (van Wees' emphasis) is absolutely no reason why you should neglect it in private, too" (Memorabilia 3.12.5). Ibid. van Wees 2004, 55, "Poorer men would get themselves a shield and spear if they had the chance. Socrates who had no regular income and whose house and furniture were worth no more than 500 drachmas, nevertheless fought as a hoplite in the large force which laid siege to Potidaea in 432?429 BC and in the general levy which invaded Boeotia in 424 BC. Men in his position, keen to serve but probably unable to afford it from their own means, might be helped out by better-off neighbours and friends."
21 The article seems grammatically superrogatory, and has been athetised by some editors. See O’Brien 1961: 414?15, n. 10.
consequently are the most daring (?a??a?e?tat??), and being the most daring (sc. because of
their science), are most brave (??d?e??tat??)? And, according to this argument, that wisdom
(s?f?a) would be ??d?e?a?”
Protagoras explains at Platonic length that that is an illicit conversion: all who are brave are daring, but not all those who are daring are bold. He compares ??d?e?a and boldness (???s??) to physical strength (?s???) and power (d??aµ??). Absent innate physical strength, power may also issue from expertise (?p?st?µ?), madness (µa??a), or even a bout of anger (??µ??). Just as in the absence of ??d?e?a, boldness may come from expertise, madness or anger. However, physical strength comes from nature and the good nurture of it in bodies (?s??? d? ?p? f?se?? ?a? e?t??f?a? t?? s?µ?t??). The sophist goes on to say that "??d?e?a comes from nature and from its good nurture in souls."22 The thought is expressed in eight words of Greek, brief so as to recall Socrates’ anecdote about the pithy remark of the stupid Spartan, at Prt. 342d6?e4, who so flustered his interlocuter with an unexpected ??µa.
I submit that the sophist's remark, at Prt. 351b1?2, is an apothegm or wise saying. A
passage in the Republic confirms that reading. At Rep. 4.429d4 et seq. Socrates locates martial
??d?e?a in a subset of citizens, fewer than the number of metal workers; these are the guardian-
soldiers of the Just City. The nature and nurture of those chosen to be guardian-soldiers is
likened to dyers who pick out, from other colors, wool that is white by nature and, by means of a complex procedure, imbue white cloth with fast colors that do not fade even when scoured by harsh detergent. The steadfastness of the guardian-solders is like the color fastness of the woolen garment.
The particulars of Socrates’ characterization of ??d?e?a in the Republic are these (Rep. 4.429e8?430a4):
. . . and when we chose (sc. those likely to become) soldiers (st?at??ta?) . . . educated
through music and gymnastics . . . persuaded that the ??µ?? [laws] are the finest things,
their ???? d??a23 [correct opinion] regarding the dreadful things (t? de???) and the other
22 The notion in so many words is not referred to by other ancient authors. Plato may have modelled it on a remark of the historical Protagoras: f?se?? ?a? ?s??se?? d?das?a??a de?ta? (DK 80 B3). See Shorey 1909.
their ???? d??a23 [correct opinion] regarding the dreadful things (t? de???) and the other
things (t? ???a) is made colorfast . . . and possessing such a gift of nature, and it having
received its appropriate nurture, . . . this I name and set down to be ??d?e?a.
The Greek text of the emphasized phrase above—d?? t? t?? te f?s?? ?a? t?? t??f?? ?p?t?de?a? ?s?????a?—echoes the sophist's characterization of ??d?e?a in Protagoras in thought and vocabulary: ??d?e?a d? ?p? f?se?? ?a? e?t??f?a? t?? ????? ????eta?. Socrates’ reprise and elaboration of Protagoras' remark in Protagoras warrants that Prt. 351b1?2 is a wise saying.24
Conversely, in Laches, Nicias reprises Socrates’ definition of ??d?e?a in Protagoras, which replaced Protagoras'. Nicias asserts, at La. 194e?195a, that ??d?e?a is the ?p?st?µ? (s?f?a in
Protagoras) of dreadful and benign circumstances in war and elsewhere. Socrates, again in
Laches, observes that t? de??? [dire circumstances] cause fear, and that fear is the expectation of
a future evil. Thus Nicias’ notion is open to the objection that his ?p?st?µ? [science] of t? de??? concerns only the future, whereas if ??d?e?a were an ?p?st?µ?, it would bear on past, present, and future alike, as sciences do. Socrates gets Nicias to acknowledge, at La. 199e12, that he does not know what ??d?e?a is. The fact that Nicias’ definition of ??d?e?a, refuted by Socrates in Laches, and subsequently withdrawn by its author, is identical to that of Socrates in Protagoras disconfirms the latter.
But what if Laches and/or the Republic had not survived? Is it possible to assess the
respective merits of Protagoras' and Socrates' sayings about ??d?e?a in Protagoras itself, aside
the external evidence cited above? Protagoras' saying changes the tenor of the conversation. This is the story so far. The sophist guardedly alluded, at Prt. 316d?317a, to his role as
23 ???? d??a concerning the dreadful things is not about recognizing phenomenal de??? as such, or noticing their absence; rather it is the ground of ???? p????? in warfare and elsewhere.
24 Except for Manuwald 1999: 377, no commentator cites the parallel passage in the Republic to Protagoras’ remark at Prt. 351b1-2. Manuwald does not see the former as a validation of the latter, pointing out merely that Socrates’ determination of courage in the Republic and in Protagoras are dissimilar: “Von diesem Faktor (sc. “the appropriate nurture of ??d?e?a” in the Republic) in Sokrates’ Ausführungen zur Tapferkeit im Protagoras nicht die Rede, weil es hier (sc. in Protagoras) nicht um die “bürgerliche” Form der Tapferkeit geht (vgl. R. 430c3), sondern um die (zunächst weniger einsichtige) Wissenskomponente.”
consigliere to political adventurers,25 was pressured by Socrates into publicly offering this service
at Prt. 318e and, as it seems, condones and counsels the pairing of ?d???a with s?f??s???
when ruling over others. But Socrates' friend Hippocrates does not desire rule over others, he desires to be made wise. If the wise saying stands—it may be assumed that the young man recognizes it as such (cf. Prt. 343b2?3)— it will necessarily26 draw Hippocrates to follow after its author, thus dissolving his friendship with Socrates,.
Immediately upon the sophist uttering the wise saying, Socrates changes the subject.27 He asks the sophist if, in living one’s life pleasantly (?d???) until one dies, one lives well (e?), in which case living pleasantly is a good thing, and painfully a bad thing. In affirming that proposition, Protagoras adds the stipulation that the pleasant things that such a man enjoys must be honorable things (t? ?a??), not base things, if they are to be good things. The coincidence of the attributes ?a??? [honorable], ??a??? [good] and ?d? [pleasant] in a well-
lived life, established at this point, is reprised later at Prt. 360a3, where Protagoras agrees that
??d?e??? [brave men] go willingly into battle because doing so is personally honorable, a good
thing for the city that is saved, and pleasurable.
Socrates wonders why the polloi lack appetitive self-control, and err in indulging in the
immediate pleasures of food, drink and sex without regard for the consequent pains of poverty and sickness. Socrates proposes that there are two kinds of pleasures and two kinds of pain, which may be distinguished inter alia by their consequences. Protagoras realizes that the
unpleasantnesses Socrates has been visiting on him are instances of a third kind of pain, like the
nasal distress of the invalid, depicted at Prt. 334b7?c6, not good, but tolerable because prospectively short term, and not bad, as is excruciating and unremitting physical pain.
25 J. S. Morrison 1941: 14?16, argues that Protagoras returned to Athens in 422 B.C.E. in aid of Alcibiades'
26 Strict causality may be assumed to be operative in a work of fiction.
27 "Do you speak of some men, Protagoras, I asked, as living well, and others ill?" (Lamb’s translation [1924: 223]). See Taylor 2003: 149/2008: 266, "Socrates abruptly begins a new argument designed to force Protagoras to accept the identity of courage with wisdom, which he finally does at 360d?e."
Distinguishing between pains has made Protagoras personally safer (?sfa??ste???) throughout his life. His amendment to Socrates’ theory is also ?sfa??ste??? in that it
improves the theory.28 As it seems to the sophist, who is feeling the third kind of pain, it saves the phenomena.
In view of his contribution to the discussion, namely his wise saying about ??d?e?a, Protagoras expects to continue playing an active role in a new discussion. He recalls Socrates' stipulation, at Prt. 348d3?4, that an inquiry be pursued collaboratively: "As you often say, Socrates, let us look at it, and if the pleasant and the good are the same, we will agree, if not, then we will dispute" (Prt. 351e3?6). Socrates replies "Do you intend to lead the s????? [inquiry], or am I to lead?" Protagoras courteously accedes to Socrates' intention to lead the s?????. Up to the point when Protagoras uttered his wise saying, the s????? was a vehicle of honest collaborative inquiry. The stipulation that inquiry be collaborative is now abandoned; a new protocol of leader and follower is imposed. That modality of speech converts the discussion into a rhetorical exercise.
Socrates’ theory of pains and pleasures is contradicted by reality, and the propositions
that Protagoras agrees to in his new role of compliant auditor will not be the product of collaborative inquiry. Those facts should suffice to reject the notion that Socrates is making a
serious case for the primacy of pleasure in living well.
Socrates commences an imaginary conversation with the polloi. He taxes the polloi as
not privileging ?p?st?µ? in making life-style choices, as he and Protagoras do; instead their notion is that pleasure overcomes them. Protagoras objects that the opinions of the polloi are not
worthy of serious inquiry. Socrates reminds the sophist of their new arrangement: I lead, you
Socrates promises that examining the opinions of the polloi will help find out about ??d?e?a (??e??e?? pe?? ??d?e?a?), this said as though Protagoras had not just delivered a wise saying about it.
The theory of the hedonic calculus is that pleasures are good, pains bad, unless contrary
28 Cf. Pl. Plt. 282b6: it is ?sfa??ste???, in applying diaeresis to a category, to cut through the middle.
consequences outweigh them; in that case, the former become bad, the latter good. That insight may be comprehended by a child, yet Socrates repeats its tenets until even the non-intellectual
polloi weary of hearing them, asking “Why indeed are you speaking about this at such great length and (sc. examining it) from every aspect?” (Prt. 354e2?4).
The hedonic calculus demonstration concludes with Socrates evoking an unidentified ?p?st?µ? to measure the pleasures of food, drink and sex against the pains of poverty and illness. The sophists’ ready acquiescence to Socrates’ proposal that they teach such an ?p?st?µ? is likely motivated by the pleasant prospect of enrolling additional students. Socrates urges the polloi to send their children to sophists to be taught an ?p?st?µ? that Hippocrates’ disciplined lifestyle indicates he already possesses. Socrates chides the polloi for being close-pursed and reluctant to fund sophists. In contrast, Hippocrates expresses at Prt. 310e1?2 the intention to spend his and his friends’ money freely to pay Protagoras’ µ?s???. For Plato, liberality is token of a noble disposition in young men.29
4. The replacement of the wise saying (Prt. 359a?360e5)
The sophist is ordered to defend the proposition to the audience (?p????e?s?? ?µ?? ???ta???a?) that ignorance [?µa??a] and ??d?e?a are compatible. (Protagoras had observed
at Prt. 349d6?8 that ?µa??a is often a vice of brave soldiers). Socrates will reprise that term in the formulation of the replacement definition of ??d?e?a.
Two propositions previously agreed to by Protagoras “prove” Socrates’ replacement faux-wise saying. Firstly, that the attributes ??a??? [good], ?d? [pleasant] and ?a??? [honorable] characterize the well-lived life. Second, that all men should pursue pleasure and avoid pain by employing an unidentified ?p?st?µ? for measuring one against the other.
These are the steps through which Socrates forces the sophist to affirm, albeit reluctantly, the replacement definition of ??d?e?a. Asked whether cowards go after t? ?a??a??a [things that allow boldness30], and whether ??d?e??? go towards t? de???, Protagoras expresses the
29 Cf. Theodorus’ praise of Theaetetus in that regard at Tht. 144d2?3.
30 Lamb’s translation (1924: 249).
conventional opinion, that cowards run away from battle, ??d?e??? the reverse.
Protagoras is asked whether ??d?e??? go into battle deeming (????µ?????) that they
will confront terrible things. The sophist considers this impossible, having agreed, at Prt. 351b4?c1, that one lives well in avoiding pain, that a pleasurable life is good, but living in pain is bad. Accordingly, by going into battle, ??d?e??? show that they do not deem war to be terrible.
Socrates gets Protagoras to agree that ". . . no one goes towards what he deems terrible,
since (?pe?d?) to be overcome by oneself was found to be ?µa??a [ignorance].” The clauses,
despite the conjunctive ?pe?d?, seem loosely connected. Socrates goes on to say "and yet all men go also to meet what they can face boldly, whether cowardly or brave, and in this respect cowardly and brave go to meet the same things."31 That observation seems to refer to undertakings that allow boldness in doing them, where the distinction between cowards and ??d?e??? would not apply.
Protagoras is apparently not interested in undangerous endeavors or activities. The
sophist reverts to the earlier topic, saying that cowards are unwilling (sc. and do not go into battle), whereas ??d?e??? (sc. go) willingly. Socrates observes that going into battle is an
honorable (?a???) act and a good thing (viz. in that it preserves the city). Asked for the identity
of those unwilling to go into battle, though it be honorable and good, Protagoras again names
To "honorable" and "good," which coextensively inform the act of going into battle,
Socrates now adds the attribute "pleasant" (?d?) in that good and pleasant coincide. Protagoras agrees that ??d?e??? believe that going into battle is good, honorable and pleasant. But Socrates placed "military campaigns" (st?ate?a?) in the list of good pains at Prt. 354a4?7.32 Going into
31 Lamb’s translation (1924: 249).
32 Socrates characterizes (sc. strenuous) gymnastic exercise, (sc. the rigors of) military campaigns, and (sc. unaesthetized) medical therapy as good pains. These are listed in order of increasing pain. Denyer, 2008, 185, points
out that cauterization, amputation, drug courses, and fasting, the procedures which are named after medical therapy, "are listed in order of decreasing pain." The figure of speech here is one of climax and anticlimax. Socrates
goes on to name the pleasures which the aforementioned good pains produce: "health, bodily fitness, the city
battle is not pleasant. The counterfactual to the present argument goes unnoticed by the sophist.
Socrates observes that ??d?e??? do not fear shameful fears, nor confidently engage in shameful activities. And for cowards, it is the opposite. The cause for the latter's behavior is said to be their ?????a [unawareness] and ?µa??a [ignorance]. Socrates finally produces the replacement definition. It is expressed as a ratio or proportion: the ignorance (?µa??a) of t?
de??? [dreadful circumstances] and t? µ? de??? [benign circumstances] is to cowardice as the s?f?a [wisdom] of t? de??? and t? µ? de??? is to ??d?e?a.
Socrates badgers the sophist to affirm the replacement definition over and over again. Protagoras is incrementally reduced to silence. After Protagoras falls silent, Socrates badgers
him for not answering. This is unpleasant.33
Socrates' final interrogatory (Prt. 360e4?5) asks whether some men are both exceptionally courageous (??d?e??tat??) and exceptionally ignorant (?µa??stat??), as Protagoras asserted earlier at Prt. 349d8. The sophist, to gratify his interlocuter, as he says, replies that the proposition seems to him impossible if one affirms, as he did, the propositions of the hedonic calculus demonstration.
4. Socrates’ anecdote about Prometheus and Epimetheus (Prt. 360e6?361d6)
Socrates states that he has been asking questions in order to examine every aspect of ??et? and, further, to investigate what ??et?, as a whole, really is. And that bears on the question which he and Protagoras have both addressed at length: whether or not ??et? is teachable, Socrates
preserved, rule over others, and wealth" (354b3?5). The pleasures seem listed in the temporal order of their origin.
Doctors restoring health to the sick, and laymen acquiring and preserving bodily fitness by engaging in sports, were ubiquitous in earlier, primitive societies, as they are in cities nowadays. Naming "health" before "bodily fitness" suggests that the former is prior in nature to the latter. In other words, acquiring and preserving fitness by means of sport and gymnastic exercise is materially contingent on being healthy enough to do so. In later times, victorious albeit painful military campaigns preserve cities and the pleasures they afford. The order in which the last two pleasures are named reflects the fact that rule over others is coeval with the establishment of cities, whereas wealth takes time to accumulate, under the aegis of the city (cf. Th. I,11,1?3; I,13,1).
33 Vlastos 1956: xxiv notes Socrates' harsh treatment of the sophist: "And his handling of Protagoras is merciless, if not cruel."
initially holding the view that it is not teachable, Protagoras that it is taught by all to all. But, as
Socrates says here, they have traded to the other their initial opinions. The speeches themselves,
laughing at their authors, explain the trade: in contrast to his initial viewpoint, Socrates latterly
demonstrated his hedonic calculus theory (after Protagoras uttered the wise saying about ??d?e?a), according to which the acrasia of the polloi may be overcome by an ?p?st?µ? of
measurement. From which it was proved that ??d?e?a is the s?f?a of t? de???.
Contrariwise, Protagoras first set it down that ??et? was teachable, but now seems as
eager for the opposite, declaring that it has been found to be almost anything but ?p?st?µ?. The representation by the laughing speeches of that opinion is accurate in that Protagoras said, at Prt. 329e5?6, that there are ??d?e??? who are unjust, and that there are many who are just but not s?f?? [wise]. From which it follows that all the parts of ??et? do not necessarily cohabit in a person. Further, that ??et?, which surely includes justice, cannot be reduced to ?p?st?µ? or s?f?a, if it is a fact that many do not possess s?f?a, yet practice justice as law-abiding citizens. Because of their topsy-turvy opinions on the teachability of ??et?, Socrates desires to examine the question once again.
Except that Socrates fears lest Epimetheus sabotage the inquiry: "Prometheus, as you represent him in your myth, suits me more than Epimetheus; I am using Prometheus and imitating him (? ???µe??? ??? ?a? p??µ????µe???), on behalf of my own life entirely in the entirety of what I am busying myself doing" (?p?? t?? ß??? t?? ?µa?t?? pa?t?? p??ta ta?ta p?a?µate??µa?). Prometheus’ doings as recounted by Protagoras follow the canonical tale: Prometheus stole fire and technology from Hephaistos and Athena in order to preserve
mankind, was brought to trial (???p?? d??? µet???e? [Prt. 322a2]), was convicted, and suffered cruel punishment.
Socrates preserves a friendship at risk by imitating Prometheus, as he says. After hearing the wise saying, he argues for a hedonic calculus that divides pain into two kinds: bad because painful, and good because productive, afterwards, of more pleasure than the original pain. But the division of pain into two kinds is belied by the reality of a third intermediate kind, neither good nor bad, as in the case of the invalid's displeasure when eating, and in Protagoras' repeated displeasure at the unpleasantnesses visited on him by Socrates. After Protagoras uttered the wise saying, the s????? ceased to be a collaborative inquiry as originally stipulated. There is the contradiction between the characterization of military campaigns as painful, at Prt. 354a4, and the fact that Protagoras is induced to affirm that the ??d?e???, in going into battle, go towards what is more honorable, better and more pleasant (?p? t? ??????? te ?a? ?µe???? ?a? ?d??? [Prt. 360a7?8]). Consider, also, that Aristotle found Socrates’ definition of ??d?e?a in Protagoras as the science of t? de??? incoherent,34 as does Socrates in Laches. Those particulars argue for the conclusion that the hedonic calculus demonstration, and the replacement definition of ??d?e?a imposed on Protagoras, are intellectually fraudulent,35 amounting to
34 At NE 1116b3?8, in the context of an extended analysis of psychic dispositions, Aristotle observes that "acquired expertise (?µpe???a) in various circumstances seems to be ??d?e?a. From that, Socrates opined that ?p?st?µ? (sc. of direl and benign circumstances) is ??d?e?a. Various folks in various circumstances demonstrate this, and particularly professional soldiers in war. For it seems that many battlefield situations are not
dangerous (p???? ?e?? t?? p???µ??), which veteran soldiers have so often observed and recognized (? µ???sta s??e????as??). So they appear (sc. to be) ??d?e???, because their (sc. inexperienced) opponents misread the situation” (?t? ??? ?sas?? ?? ????? ??? ?st??). Recognition from prior experience of a non-threatening situation on the battlefield seems to be an instance of a s?f?a or ?p?st?µ? of t? µ? de???, and argues for one limb of Socrates’ definiton of ??d?e?a in Protagoras. The discussion at NE 1116b3?8 turns elsewhere, which suggests that Aristotle was unable to imagine an instance of how recognizing t? de??? on the battlefield, or anywhere else, might require ?p?st?µ?. At EE 1229a13?16, Aristotle again finds it impossible to parse Socrates' notion of the ?p?st?µ? of t? de???. Aristotle defines military ??d?e?a in the latter passage to be "from experience (d?’ ?µpe???a?) and knowing (t? e?d??a?)—not as Socrates said regarding (sc. ??d?e?a as the ?p?st?µ? of) t? de???—but how to take protective measures in dire circumstances” (?t? t?? ß???e?a? t?? de????). At EE 1230a5?11, Aristotle uses the analogy of experienced sailors climbing masts in heavy seas to refute Socrates: "Similarly do many endure danger through expertise, which is the expedient that by far most soldiers employ. This is the opposite of Socrates’ opinion, in supposing that ?p?st?µ? (sc. of t? de???) is ??d?e?a. For it is not by knowing of the frightful dangers from which sailors take courage, those who know how to climb masts (sc. in heavy seas), but because they know protective measures for those dire circumstances (??te ??? d?? t? e?d??a? t? f?ße?? ?a????s?? ?? ?p? t??? ?st??? ??aßa??e?? ?p?st?µe???, ???? ?t? ?sas? t?? ß???e?a? t?? de????).
35 At the beginning of Protagoras, Socrates encounters an acquaintance who knows of his public stance as an ??ast?? [lover] of Alcibiades. Asked how the beautiful young man has been treating him, Socrates replies "Well, as it seemed to me, not least than on this very day. For he said many things about me, coming to my aid. And I have
crimes committed against logos, arguments contrived for the sake of preserving a friendship, comic analogues to Prometheus' crimes against Hephaistos and Athena, committed for the sake of preserving mankind, to compare small to large.
What then would be Epimetheus' dire effect on the s?????? Just as Epimetheus was unconcerned with our preservation in the distribution (?? t? d?a??µ? ?µ???se? ?µ?? [Prt. 361d1?2]), so would he be unconcerned whether the friendship between Socrates and Hippocrates endures, or the young man abandons family and friends to associate with Protagoras. Epimetheus' indifference in that matter permits an impartial objectivity. Socrates fears that objective Epimethean examination of the s????? would trip it up (sf???) and trick it (??apat?sa?), in other words, negate its putative standing and negate the trickery of it being a
set of specious arguments.36 The anecdote about Prometheus and Epimetheus permits Socrates guardedly to acknowledge his imposture.
5. Protagoras’ lack of resentment (Prt. 361d7?362a4)
Protagoras declares that he is "least of all a resentful man" (f???e??? te ???st' ?????p??). A
only just left him. However there is a strange thing I have to tell you: although he was present, I not merely paid him no attention, but at times forgot him altogether" (Lamb’s translation of Prt. 309b5?9 [1924: 93, 95]). The
acquaintance asks whether he has encountered someone of greater beauty than Alcibiades. Socrates replies "Yes, of far greater." He explains that the man's beauty is greater in that the highest wisdom appears more beautiful (t? s?f?tat?? ??????? fa??es?a? [Prt. 309c11?12]). But Protagoras is, in fact, an old (cf. Prt. 317c3), unbeautiful man, and the sophist's homo-mensura doctrine is not the highest wisdom. Socrates is speaking playfully in order to get his interlocuter to set aside a preoccupation with beautiful bodies, and direct his attention, instead, to the discussions with Protagoras. Eros is made to give way to philosophy, so to speak. Alcibiades' remark, at Prt. 336c2?4, supports this reading. Commenting on Socrates' denial, at Prt. 334c8?9, that he has a good memory, Alcibiades is prepared to wager that he is not forgetful at all, "not but that he plays (pa??e?) and says that he is forgetful." The audience is put on notice ab initio that when occasion warrants, Socrates speaks playfully, i.e. insincerely or speciously.
36 Comparable to this pair of negativizing counteractions against the specious s????? that Socrates has conducted after hearing the sophist’s wise saying, a pair of negativizing counteractions against an action as well as against the actor’s existence is to be found at Rep. 6.494e4?495a1. The conversion of a promising young man,
remark in Laws suggests that the sophist, in uttering his wise saying, demonstrates such a disposition. At Lg. 5.730e1?731a3, the Athenian stranger observes that s?f??s??? and f????s?? [judgment] are untransferable good things, meaning that those who possess those virtues are unable to give them to another. The stranger goes on to speak of other good things that are transferable. Some who possess a ?t?µa [valuable thing] are able to share it with others, whilst keeping it for themselves. Others who possess a ?t?µa wish to share, but are unable to. And then there is the resentful man (t?? d? f??????ta), who is "unwilling that a commonality of good things with anyone else come to be through friendship." Accordingly, Protagoras, in uttering his wise saying, shares in a friendly way, without resentment, a ?t?µa he possesses.
Protagoras praises Socrates saying “I would not be surprised were you to become one of those reputed for wisdom.” The sophist announces that the time has come to turn to something else. Socrates leaves Kallias' house with Hippocrates, their friendship preserved.
persuaded to abandon political ambition, and pursue philosophy instead, arouses the anger of men of the city whose political protégé he is. The persuaded young man is unpersuaded by the angry friends (?a? pe?? a?t??,
?p?? ?? µ? pe?s??), and the Socrates-like philosopher who persuaded him, is rendered not such as he was (?a? pe?? t?? pe????ta, ?p?? ?? µ? ???? t’ ?), i.e. relieved of existence by assassination or judicial execution.
Michael Eisenstadt Austin
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